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The present research examined if mindfulness reduced negativity bias on 
measures of attitude formation and cognitive style, as a potential explanation for the 
beneficial effects of mindfulness on emotional disturbance.  Two studies were conducted.  
Study One was correlational and found that trait mindfulness inversely correlated with 
measures of negative cognitive style, and that the latter partially mediated an inverse 
association between mindfulness and predisposition to depression and anxiety.  Further, 
correlations between mindfulness and both positive attitude formation and optimism 
hinted at a potential positivity bias.  Study Two extended these findings using a 
randomized experimental design comparing a mindfulness induction to an unfocused 
   
 x 
attention control condition. The mindfulness condition demonstrated a positivity bias in 
attitude formation and increased optimism compared to the control condition, but did not 
demonstrate bias in attitude generalization.  Potential explanations and implications for 
emotional disturbance are discussed. 
  1 
CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
 
Mindfulness has been described as a certain attentional quality brought to 
moment-by-moment experience (Kabat-Zinn, 1990).  Cultivating this particular quality of 
consciousness is thought to confer mental health benefits (Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson, 
2007).  Indeed, a substantial body of literature supports the usefulness of mindfulness-
based approaches for preventing or reducing emotional disturbance (cf. Brown, Ryan, & 
Creswell, 2007).  However, little research has focused on the mechanisms by which 
mindfulness may do so.  One possibility is that mindfulness may reduce the influence of 
biases in cognitive processing.  Theories of mental health generally maintain that a 
relatively accurate view of reality facilitates psychological adjustment (Leary, 2004), and 
many researchers include the terms “unbiased” and “objective” in descriptions of mindful 
awareness (Brown et al., 2007; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006).  For 
example, mindfulness “is thought to allow the person to „acknowledge and accept the 
situation for what it is‟ … In terms of implicated psychological processes, this seems to 
involve reliance less
 
on preconceived ideas, beliefs, and biases and more on paying
 
attention to all available information” (Bishop, 2002, p. 74).  However, there is a lack of 
empirical data demonstrating a causal link between mindfulness and reduced bias.  The 
present research will test this proposed mechanism for benefits of mindfulness, 
specifically investigating negativity bias. 
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Mindfulness: An Overview 
The concept of mindfulness has roots in Eastern, particularly Buddhist, meditation 
practices yet is described as a universally inherent capacity that enhances insight into the 
nature of experience and mitigates psychological suffering (Kabat-Zinn, 2003).  It has 
been conceptualized as a nonjudgmental awareness of and attention to current internal 
and external experiences (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008).   
Dismantling this definition, the foundation of mindfulness is sustained attention 
(Brown et al., 2007).  Moreover, it involves awareness of the direction of attention and 
potentially the ability to flexibly switch attention between thoughts or feelings and 
present stimuli (Bishop et al., 2004).  Bishop and colleagues explain that this 
metacognitive process of attention regulation maintains a nonelaborative stance toward 
thoughts, feelings and sensations as they occur.  If a thought or feeling elaborates past 
initial perception of a stimulus, cognitive inhibition can reduce further elaboration.  This 
inhibition should not be confused with suppression because thoughts and feelings are 
acknowledged as they arise.  They are simply noticed rather than entertained 
automatically.  This reduction of mental elaboration facilitates an orientation toward 
current experience.  Less attention on elaborative thinking should free conscious 
resources to process information that is immediate to the present moment (Martin, 1997).  
In this way, mindfulness is considered to entail a wider perspective that detects and 
integrates information with greater attention, moment by moment.   
Willing, receptive observation of information involves an additional feature of 
mindfulness: a nondiscriminatory interest in experience, often called acceptance (cf. 
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Bishop et al., 2004; Cardaciotto et al., 2008).  Not to be confused with passivity or 
resignation, acceptance here reflects an active process of being open to and curious about 
all information rather than letting awareness adhere to some limited or judgmental 
agenda.  All current information and experience is potentially subject to observation.  
Some stress that within the traditional notion of mindfulness, this acceptance entails 
kindness and compassion (e.g., Grossman, 2008; Kabat-Zinn, 2003).  Still, it may be best 
to view such qualities as distinct correlates of mindfulness to avoid confounding the 
construct (Bishop et al., 2004).   
Mindfulness can be examined as a trait as it is considered an inherent capacity and 
individuals may vary in their general level of mindfulness in everyday functioning (e.g., 
Brown & Ryan, 2003).  For example, when eating mindfully, one attends to the various 
immediate sensations of the food as if it is novel.  Consider an apple.  When mindful, one 
might first notice its color, shape, size, and texture.  Upon biting into it, the apple might 
be characterized as crisp or mealy, sweet or bland, and juicy or rather dry.  One might 
also notice how it feels against the lips, teeth and tongue.  When reactions, such as 
feelings of pleasure or distaste and thoughts like “this is good (or bad)” occur, they are 
observed and noticed as momentary internal phenomena.  This process can be contrasted 
with mindlessly consuming the apple: being completely preoccupied in other thoughts 
without noticing and implicitly assuming that one already knows what an apple is like.  
Such a continuum of mindfulness to mindlessness is possible in various everyday 
activities and events.  Measurements of trait mindfulness attempt to assess where on this 
continuum individuals tend to be throughout daily life.    
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Mindfulness also may be investigated as a state or mode into or out of which one 
enters (e.g., Bishop et al., 2004) or that can be heightened.  From this perspective, 
mindfulness is akin to an attentional skill that one can practice and learn to employ, and 
that is relatively absent when not employed.  Mindfulness meditation is a practice used to 
cultivate a mindful state or mode; state measures of mindfulness can be used immediately 
after practice to assess the degree to which mindfulness was evoked.  It is not yet clear if 
and to what degree such practices increase trait mindfulness (Thompson & Waltz, 2007) 
although some research suggests that they do (e.g., Shapiro, Oman, Thoresen, Plante, & 
Flinders, 2008).   
The conceptualization of mindfulness just described should be distinguished from 
Langer‟s (1989) conceptualization of mindfulness as the active creation of new 
categorizations for or perspectives toward stimuli.  Langer‟s conceptualization refers 
more to a particular cognitive activity oriented toward external stimuli, rather than a 
receptive observation of both internal and external occurrences.  There may be some 
similarity in terms of being engaged with stimuli as if they were new, which is supported 
by moderate (.23-.39) correlations between related subscales of Langer‟s trait 
mindfulness scale (Bodner & Langer, 2001) and a measure of trait mindfulness based on 
the conceptualization used here (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  For this reason it is noteworthy 
that Langer has proposed (cf. Langer, 1989) and in some cases found (e.g., Dijikic, 
Langer, & Stapleton, 2008) that her conceptualization of mindfulness reduces reliance on 
biases.  However, both Langer and mindfulness meditation researchers agree that the two 
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conceptualizations of mindfulness differ substantially (e.g.,Bishop et al., 2004; Brown et 
al., 2007).      
Benefits of Mindfulness 
 Mindfulness has received considerable attention in the clinical literature in terms 
of its benefits as part of interventions or particular practices; it also has received some, 
albeit much less, attention in other domains of psychology and as an isolated construct 
(cf. Baer, 2003; Bishop, 2002; Brown et al., 2007).  The extant literature suggests that 
mindfulness is beneficial to one‟s well-being.  Correlational studies have demonstrated 
that measures of trait mindfulness are associated with lower levels of psychological 
distress (e.g., depression, anxiety, hostility and stress) and associated with higher levels 
of psychological well-being (e.g., positive affect, competence, vitality and life 
satisfaction) (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Brown & Ryan, 2003; 
Cardaciotto et al., 2008).     
The bulk of experimental research has examined the effects of mindfulness 
meditation, especially the efficacy of interventions based on such practices.  Mindfulness 
research gained momentum roughly 25 years ago with the development and evaluation of 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1982).  MBSR is a multi-
component, eight-week intervention that teaches mindfulness skills to reduce stress and 
improve coping with physical and psychological ailments.  Participants learn and practice 
mindful attention toward various experiences, such as the qualities of each breath as it 
occurs, sensory aspects of eating a common food, and sensations of the body during 
yoga.  Two meta-analyses (Baer, 2003; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004) 
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indicate that MBSR leads to improvements on various measures of mental and physical 
health, with moderate effect sizes.   
Additional mindfulness-based treatments have been developed specifically to 
address psychological disorders (cf. Brown et al., 2007).  Most relevant to the present 
work is Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 
2002).  Like MBSR, MBCT centers on mindfulness practices.  It also includes aspects of 
cognitive therapy (CT; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).  Growing evidence supports 
the efficacy of MBCT for preventing relapse of depression (Baer, 2003; Segal et al., 
2002; Williams, Russell, & Russell, 2008) and its promise for anxiety disorders including 
generalized anxiety disorder (Evans et al., 2008; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002, 2007).   
Cognitive Theories of Depression and Anxiety 
Cognitive theories of depression and anxiety provide a well-established and 
clinically relevant framework in which to examine how mindfulness practices may 
benefit psychological well-being.  Cognitive approaches emphasize negatively biased 
cognitive processes as a cause of depression and anxiety.  Thus, cognitive therapy 
focuses on changing these cognitive biases to alleviate the emotional disorders.   
In terms of depression, according to the two major cognitive theories – 
hopelessness theory (Abramson, Metalsky & Alloy, 1989) and Beck‟s (1987) theory – 
negatively biased cognitive styles increase vulnerability to depression.  Using a 
prospective design, Alloy and colleagues (2000, 2006) demonstrated that negative 
inferential tendencies and dysfunctional attitudes (unrealistic and negatively biased 
assumptions about oneself, the world, and the future) predicted onset as well as higher 
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lifetime prevalence of major depressive disorder.  Further, a recent review (Garratt, 
Ingram, Rand, & Sawalani, 2007) concluded that cognitive changes, such as 
improvements in dysfunctional attitudes and attributions, resulting from cognitive therapy 
predict improvements in depressive symptoms.  It also is important to note that the most 
current evidence does not support the depressive realism hypothesis.  Depressive realism 
contradicts the notion that depressed individuals are negatively biased by contending that 
depressed individuals are more realistic than nondepressed individuals.  Most research on 
this hypothesis has yielded inconsistent findings and has been criticized for using 
methods with no objective or reliably agreed upon standard of reality (Ackermann & 
DeRubeis, 1991).  Thus, to create a more valid test of the depressive realism hypothesis, 
Moore and Fresco (2007) evaluated participants‟ accuracy using (a) objectively real 
events and causes, and (b) pre-determined rating standards based on multiple, extensively 
trained raters who met a high level of inter-rater reliability, thereby limiting rater bias.  
Their study found that depressed individuals were less realistic, showing a significant 
negativity bias, compared to nondepressed individuals.  
Cognitive theories of anxiety disorders also focus on negatively biased cognitive 
patterns.  Central to such theories is an overestimation of threat based on schemas of 
danger that distort information processing (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997).  The looming 
vulnerability model (LVM; Riskind, 1997; Riskind, Williams, & Joiner, 2006) identifies 
a cognitive style that is common in anxiety disorders but unique from depressive 
cognition.  Looming vulnerability refers to a dynamic sense of a risk that grows rapidly 
with time or proximity.  This can be an appropriate response if it adjusts proportionately 
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to the actual level of threat, but it becomes dysfunctional the more that it does not 
accurately correspond to reality.  The looming cognitive style may underlie many 
cognitive biases that have been implicated in anxiety, including disproportionate 
allocation of attention to threats rather than safety cues, less habituation to feared stimuli, 
and interpretations biased toward danger (cf. Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & Ijzendoorn, 2007).  Further, inducing such biases has been found to cause 
anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002).   
 Although the precise nature of the cognitive biases in depression and anxiety can 
differ, it is clear that both disorders involve biases toward negativity.  A complementary 
finding demonstrated that greater predisposition to both depression and anxiety was 
associated with biased learning and attitude formation (Shook, Fazio, & Vasey, 2007).  
Specifically, participants who scored higher on depression and anxiety scales 
demonstrated poorer learning of positively valenced novel stimuli, whereas there was no 
difference in learning of negative stimuli.  Thus, individuals who were predisposed to 
depression and anxiety had a tendency to form more negative attitudes than positive 
attitudes.  Thus, an under-appreciation for positive stimuli may underlie both disorders.   
In its traditional form, cognitive therapy (CT) aims to weaken the negativity 
biases underlying depression and anxiety by changing their roots: an underlying 
negatively biased schema (Beck et al., 1979).  This approach of schema modification has 
been described as an accommodation model of change (Hollon, Evans, & DeRubeis, 
1990).  It aims to directly alter cognitive content (e.g., through problem solving, testing 
the validity of thoughts, and substituting rational beliefs for irrational ones) so it is less 
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negatively biased.  Because changes in a schema cannot be measured directly, reduced 
biases in attention, attributions, interpretations and attitudes serve as indications of 
schema change (Garratt et al., 2007).  Thus, a goal of traditional CT often is to restructure 
the content of an individual‟s thoughts, so that their beliefs and feelings are less 
negatively biased.  To achieve this goal, individuals may be encouraged to consider the 
validity and necessity of their existing perspectives while also considering alternate 
interpretations of experiences and events.     
Similar to aspects of CT, MBCT teaches individuals to develop awareness of 
thoughts and feelings as impermanent mental events of questionable truth rather than as 
necessarily accurate accounts of self or reality.  Although the approach of MBCT is 
related to that of CT, the focus of MBCT is to adjust the context for mental content 
(Teasdale et al., 2002), with less emphasis on changing the nature of that content.  That 
is, MBCT encourages the reframing of maladaptive mental content (e.g., curiously 
observing and acknowledging without engaging or avoiding) without directly trying to 
alter it (e.g., modifying irrational beliefs to be more rational).  MBCT teaches individuals 
to accept and experience their negative beliefs and emotions, but not to dwell on them 
and to focus on the present moment.  This emphasis on cognitive context over content is 
emblematic of theories about mindfulness (e.g., Brown et al., 2007; Hayes, 2004; Shapiro 
et al., 2006).   
 The context-oriented approach of MBCT can be characterized as an activation-
deactivation model rather than an accommodation model (Hollon et al., 1990).  In the 
activation-deactivation model, certain mental contexts prevent recurrent depressive or 
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anxious symptoms by deactivating negatively biased schemas.  Recall that in MBCT, a 
metacognitive stance reframes how mental information is processed so that it is not 
automatically pursued (Scherer-Dickson, 2004).  When a trigger – a sad mood or an 
anxiety-provoking situation – occurs, then negatively biased reaction patterns can be 
recognized and intentionally processed as mental phenomena without necessarily 
subscribing to or identifying with them (Segal et al., 2002).  This can prevent further 
cognitive elaboration on them.  Within the activation-deactivation model, this prevents 
the continued activation of the biased schema that would otherwise occur by either (a) 
automatically following schema-determined thoughts and feelings as usual, or (b) 
actively challenging them as may occur in traditional cognitive therapy.  By preventing 
the continued activation of negatively biased schemas, they may have less impact in the 
present.  Over time, it is conceivable that their initial activation could be reduced.      
Interestingly, this suggests that adjusting mental context can have implications for 
cognitive content, even though mental content itself is not the focus in mindfulness-based 
approaches such as MBCT.  To deactivate a schema, compensatory schemas may be 
activated (Hollon et al., 1990).  Compensatory schemas provide alternate, more adaptive 
skills for dealing with stressors.  Mindfulness skills comprise a compensatory schema.  
Practicing the metacognitive, present-moment perspective of mindfulness, negatively 
biased cognitive patterns can be acknowledged with acceptance while attention can be 
redirected toward the actual qualities of each moment as it unfolds (Garratt et al., 2007; 
Segal et al., 2002; Sherer-Dickson, 2004).  This suggests that cognition would be less 
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occupied with negatively biased thoughts and more focused on openly noticing aspects of 
what is actually occurring, such as the details of one‟s sensations or environment.       
Consistent with this approach and cognitive theory overall, Segal and colleagues 
(2002) do provide some explanation of the relationship between a mindful context and 
mental content in individuals with depressive or anxious tendencies.  They describe that 
for these individuals, normal classification of incoming stimuli as pleasant or unpleasant 
can trigger mind-wandering into biased elaborations such as distorted interpretations.  
Using mindfulness to reduce such mind-wandering and recognize such elaborations, 
fewer schematic attachments are affixed to basic observations and more attention can be 
given to what is actually occurring.  Segal and colleagues add that this process has the 
potential not only to reduce exaggerations of negative events but also to increase 
awareness of pleasant events.  With this explanation, they imply that the context-oriented 
approach of MBCT, and of mindfulness in general, can affect mental content so that it is 
less affected by negativity biases and instead occupied with other information.    
In sum, mindfulness-based approaches such as MBCT may alter cognitive content 
even though they are focused on context.  Further, it should be noted that the perspective-
taking process of traditional CT may alter cognitive context in order to change cognitive 
content. Indeed, some have asked if mindfulness-based approaches actually differ from 
traditional CT or if they simply call attention to context (Garratt et al., 2007).  Although 
the approaches undoubtedly are related, CT differs from mindfulness-based approaches 
in that it may actively employ and reinforce cognitive elaboration by directly evaluating 
cognition; therefore, it may sway toward mental preoccupation and endorsing certain 
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biases over others.  On the other hand, mindfulness-based approaches offer a unique 
process of reducing elaboration and attending to the present.  This may enable individuals 
to be less influenced by or susceptible to negativity biases.  Hence, it would be useful to 
know if mindfulness does reduce negativity bias and if this is a mechanism through 
which mindfulness prevents or reduces emotional distress.   
Mechanisms of Mindfulness 
Before turning to reduced negativity bias as a potential mechanism of 
mindfulness, it is important to consider existing evidence on possible mechanisms of 
mindfulness.  Research on such mechanisms is just beginning to develop (Arch & 
Craske, 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006).  That which has been done centers largely on 
emotional reactivity and rumination without directly considering cognitive biases.   
First, it has been proposed that mindfulness reduces emotional reactivity.  That is, 
mindfulness may attenuate the extremity of affective experience which, in turn, reduces 
the likelihood of depression and anxiety.  Arch and Craske (2006) found that participants 
who underwent a 15-minute focused breathing induction (modeled on a mindfulness 
exercise) reported significantly less negative emotion in response to negatively valenced 
pictures compared to those who received a worry or unfocused attention induction.  The 
authors suggested that these results indicated faster recovery or less emotional reactivity 
after exposure to negative stimuli.  Similar conclusions have been drawn from studies 
that tested the effect of acceptance-oriented inductions on coping with an aversive 
situation, breathing carbon dioxide enriched air (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt, Brown, 
Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004).  These studies found that participants in the acceptance 
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induction condition reported less subjective anxiety and displayed less behavioral 
avoidance compared to a controlled-breathing induction condition (Eifert & Heffner, 
2003), and to suppression and control conditions (Levitt et al., 2004).  Another study 
(Broderick, 2005) found that brief mindfulness meditation improved recovery from an 
induced sad mood.  Further, a mixed-design study by Ortner, Kilner, and Zelazo (2007) 
also was discussed in terms of emotional reactivity.  They examined attentional control in 
emotional contexts, comparing three conditions: two groups that were trained for seven 
weeks in either mindfulness meditation or body awareness/relaxation, plus a waiting-list 
control group.  A measure of emotional interference that assessed reaction times on a 
cognitive task during the presentation of positive, neutral or negative pictures was 
administered before and after the seven weeks.  Only the mindfulness meditation group 
showed a significant reduction in the time used to disengage from unpleasant pictures to 
respond on the cognitive task.            
Some researchers (e.g., Brown et al., 2007) suggest that such findings may 
indicate that emotional evenness rather than reactivity is inherent in mindfulness based on 
its “non-evaluative aspect” (p. 220).  Although meditation practices reduce autonomic 
arousal (Takahashi, 2005) and mindfulness may reduce identification with particular 
emotional responses (Segal et al., 2002), characterizing mindfulness as minimizing 
affectively valenced reactions and as being non-evaluative is questionable.  First, other 
research suggests that increased present-moment attention can maintain or increase 
sensitivity to the valence of an experience in the moment (e.g., Cioffi & Holloway, 1993; 
LeBel & Dubé, 2001) and that mindfulness is associated with increased compassion 
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(Neff, 2003).  Moreover, describing mindfulness as non-evaluative may be problematic 
because mindfulness would not be adaptive if it precluded all discernment.  The 
nondiscriminatory property of mindfulness pertains to remaining open to and curious 
about all information, including affective information and evaluative reactions, with 
attentional flexibility.  Likewise, Nielsen and Kaszniak (2006) found that Buddhist 
meditators displayed increased awareness and clarity of emotions including improved 
valence discrimination.  Indeed, Ortner and colleagues‟ (2007) findings provide evidence 
of attentional flexibility resulting from training in mindfulness meditation.  Further, a 
study by Wenk-Sormaz (2005) provided preliminary evidence that meditation training 
may reduce habitual responding.  Such results support the contention here that 
mindfulness produces more clearly informed, less biased appraisals rather than habitually 
biased reactions, which could produce greater equanimity when appropriate but differs 
from the idea that mindfulness simply attenuates affective reactions.   
In fact, it is possible that all of the above findings used to support the emotional 
reactivity explanation could be due to the alternative explanation that participants‟ overall 
evaluations were less affected by a bias toward overemphasizing negative information 
(forms of this bias are also common to some degree in nonclinical populations; cf. 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001).  Arch and Craske (2006) found that 
the focused breathing condition reported less negative responses to neutral slides 
compared to the unfocused attention and worry conditions.  Similarly, Ortner, Kilner, and 
Zelazo (2007) found that only mindfulness meditation training (and not the other 
conditions) led to a decrease in negativity ratings of unpleasant stimuli.  In the study by 
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Eifert and Heffner (2003), participants in the acceptance-induction condition rated the 
aversive situation as less unpleasant than did the comparison group.  Levitt and 
colleagues (2004) reported that participants in their acceptance-induction condition did 
not evaluate their physical symptoms as negatively as did those in the other two 
conditions.  In sum, all of these results suggest that mindfulness-based inductions 
changed participants‟ evaluations – perhaps so that negative information was not 
weighted as heavily – which could explain why participants appeared less emotionally 
reactive.   
A second proposed mechanism to the benefits of mindfulness is that mindfulness 
reduces rumination, which is associated with emotional disorders.  Measures of trait 
mindfulness negatively correlate with rumination (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003; 
Cardaciotto, 2008).  Coffey and Hartman (2008) found that rumination partially mediated 
a relationship between trait mindfulness and lower psychological distress.  Among many 
experimental studies, Ramel, Goldin, Carmona, and McQuaid (2004) found that MBSR 
participation decreased rumination, and this accounted for some improvement in 
additional cognitive and affective variables.  Similarly, Jain and colleagues (2007) found 
that mindfulness meditation training reduced rumination, which in turn partially mediated 
a reduction in reported distress.  Furthermore, this effect of mindfulness meditation on 
rumination was not due to relaxation, given that a comparison group trained in relaxation 
did not experience significantly reduced rumination.   
Mindfulness is antithetical to rumination because rumination dwells in thoughts 
and feelings about the past and future whereas mindfulness witnesses moment-by-
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moment experience as it unfolds.  The self-perpetuating nature of the dwelling that 
characterizes rumination is itself problematic (Segal et al., 2002); however, a key aspect 
of this dwelling is that it is negatively biased.  For example, dwelling in the form of 
increased rehearsal of information in an unbiased manner, such as carefully studying for 
an exam or preparing a presentation, is not harmful.  An important aspect of mindfulness 
in terms of rumination may be that by reducing the tendency to dwell on and identify 
with negative thoughts, negative schemas are engaged less and compensatory skills are 
used that decrease bias.  In turn, stimuli can be evaluated more objectively (when 
evaluation is appropriate), perhaps reducing the amount of negatively-oriented concerns 
and increasing awareness of positive qualities.  Again, a shift in cognitive functioning 
toward more unbiased processing may explain the association between rumination and 
mindfulness. 
The proposed mechanism in this thesis, that mindfulness reduces bias, has not 
been examined directly but has been suggested by some research.  First, a theory recently 
proposed by Shapiro and colleagues (2006) to explain the mechanisms of mindfulness 
suggests that a fundamental, overarching mechanism for other mechanisms is 
“reperceiving.”  This is described as a process of stepping back “from the contents of 
consciousness (i.e., one‟s thoughts)” and viewing “his or her moment-by-moment 
experience with greater clarity and objectivity” (p. 377).  They continue: “Reperceiving, 
in which there is increasing capacity for objectivity in relationship to one‟s 
internal/external experience, is in many ways the hallmark of mindfulness practice” (p. 
378).  In other words, mindfulness reduces biases in attention to and processing of 
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information.  Shapiro and colleagues did not provide direct evidence of such reduced 
bias, but other research provides some indirect support.  
The study by Ramel and colleagues (2004) aimed to examine the effects of 
MBSR on cognition.  They focused on rumination because it, like mindfulness, creates a 
context for cognition.  However, they did include a measure of dysfunctional attitudes, an 
important measure of bias in emotional disorders, and reported significant improvements 
on this measure resulting from the intervention.  Another measure of bias was included in 
a study by Heppner et al. (under review) on mindfulness and aggression.  They found that 
trait mindfulness was associated with less biased perceptions of hostile intent in socially 
ambiguous situations.   
Herndon (2008) studied trait mindfulness in relation to two cognitive factors that 
could be related to bias: external encoding, a measure of thoroughness in attending to the 
external environment, as well as cognitive failures, a measure of common errors from 
failing to notice things.  A moderate positive correlation was found between trait 
mindfulness and external encoding.  Additionally, strong negative correlations were 
found between mindfulness and cognitive failures including memory, distractibility and 
blunders.  Herndon thus suggests that mindfulness could reduce errors that are due to 
self-focus biases and inflexibility when interpreting one‟s environment.  This explanation 
does not acknowledge that self-focus may not be detrimental when it simply involves 
internal state awareness rather than ruminative self-consciousness (e.g., Trapnell & 
Cambell, 1999), and mindfulness seems to involve only the former (Brown & Ryan, 
2003).  Further, it has been suggested that this more adaptive type of self-focus in 
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mindfulness integrates better with externally focused attention (Brown et al., 2007).  
Regardless, Herndon‟s results, along with those of Ramel et al. and Heppner et al., 
support that mindfulness may foster objectivity and reduce bias.   
Additional indirect support comes from suggestions that mindfulness may be 
characterized by less ego-involvement as indicated by less defensive behavior.  Heppner 
and Kernis (2007) suggest that the processes involved in being mindful "quiet the ego" 
(p. 248).  That is, they prevent self-worth from being linked to or threatened by everyday 
affairs.  They provide initial evidence for this in their research linking mindfulness to 
reduced aggressiveness (Heppner et al., under review) and verbal defensiveness (Lakey, 
Kernis, Heppner, & Lance, 2008).  Similarly, Leary, Adams, and Tate (2006) suggest that 
mindfulness promotes "hypo-egoic functioning" (p. 1822) by decreasing abstract 
thoughts about the self and increasing concrete thoughts on one's current situation.  
Building on this hypothesis, they suggest that mindfulness may improve self-regulation 
by helping people to accept and engage reality.  While more research is needed on such 
ideas, they suggest that by being less self-defensive, more mindful individuals may 
experience more openness to current reality.  This could also imply that adjustments to 
thought content occur with less effort or internal conflict.  In interventions like MBCT, 
this may facilitate the reduction in negativity biased cognition that is key in CT.  
Research directly testing this proposed mechanism is warranted. 
Mechanisms: Methodological Issues 
One likely reason that the relationship between mindfulness and bias has not 
received more direct empirical attention is simply the nascence of research on 
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mindfulness as an isolated construct rather than as part of a larger intervention.  Self-
report scales are the primary measures of mindfulness, and these were developed and 
tested only recently.  Moreover, some disagreement exists over how to operationalize the 
construct (e.g., Bishop, 2002; Grossman, 2008).  For example, the Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003) is a unidimensional measure of present-centered 
attention and awareness based on reverse-scored items describing inattentiveness.  
Although this scale could be critiqued as reductionistic (Grossman, 2008), in comparison 
to many others this measure may better reflect the core of traditional Buddhist 
conceptualizations.  On the other hand, the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills 
(KIMS; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) and the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire 
(FFMQ; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006) are multidimensional 
measures including the following factors: observing, describing, acting with awareness, 
accepting without judging, and – for the FFMQ – nonreactivity to inner experience.  
These scales reflect some Western practitioners‟ preference for a multidimensional 
measure that mirrors the skills taught in many mindfulness-based interventions; however, 
these factors may extend beyond traditional notions of mindfulness and some of the 
factors overlap with each other.  Perhaps finding some middle ground, Cardaciotto and 
colleagues (2008) just developed the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHILMS), a 
bidimensional measure of two key components that are found in most Western definitions 
of mindfulness and appear to contribute to mental health: present-moment awareness and 
acceptance.  The different measures of trait mindfulness tend to correlate with each other, 
but the magnitude varies (Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Grossman, 2008).   
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Similar challenges are found in laboratory-based inductions attempting to 
manipulate mindfulness.  Because true mindfulness requires training over time, 
approximations of mindfulness are used for efficiency and to explore the effects of 
simple instructions on novices.  These proxies for mindfulness, such as Arch and 
Craske‟s (2006) “focused breathing” induction, LeBel and Dubé‟s (2001) “sensory 
focusing” induction, and Eifert and Heffner‟s (2003) “acceptance” induction, emphasize 
somewhat different aspects of mindfulness.    
In sum, multiple operationalizations now exist to study the construct but some 
differences have yet to be resolved.  This limitation may be most problematic to those 
with extensive experience in Buddhist psychology; some criticize all existing measures 
because mindfulness “is not to be fully comprehended by discursive, theoretical, or 
intellectual thinking but primarily relies on practical introspective practices considered 
undeveloped in most inexperienced individuals” (Grossman, 2008, p. 405).  Nonetheless, 
most Western researchers seem to find practical value and relevance – as well as 
converging evidence – in the progress that has been made and call for more research on 
the mechanisms of mindfulness (e.g., Brown et al., 2007; Shapiro et al., 2006).     
A Social Psychological Approach: Attitudinal and Attributional Biases 
Another potential reason that biases have not been studied in relation to 
mindfulness is that certain types of biases tend to be studied in domains outside of 
applied clinical psychology, which has been the primary area of mindfulness research.  
Biases have been referred to broadly here thus far, but they may occur in various 
cognitive processes.  Two well-established domains of social psychological research, in 
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which cognitive biases have been examined and linked to depression and anxiety, will be 
the focus of the present research: attitudes, which will be the primary consideration, and 
attributions. 
Attitudes are summary evaluations made toward some object (Zanna & Rempel, 
1988), which can be any object including the self.  These summary evaluations are items 
of knowledge associated with an object (cf. Fazio, 2007) that vary on a positive to 
negative continuum, such as good/bad, desirable/undesirable, approach/avoid, and so 
forth (Breckler, 1984).  According to the tripartite model as described by Zanna and 
Rempel, attitudes may be based on affective, cognitive and/or behavioral information.  
Because attitudes by their very nature involve a range from positive to negative, 
examining attitudes is very useful for uncovering biases toward negativity (or positivity, 
for that matter).   
It is unsurprising, then, that negatively-oriented attitudes are characteristic of the 
cognitive biases found in depression and anxiety (Garratt et al., 2007; Kopp, 1989).  In 
the clinical literature, attitudinal bias often is measured with self-report instruments like 
the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978), which assesses the 
extent to which one‟s self-evaluations are based on inflexible and unrealistic standards.  
Such measures can be useful.  At the same time, they are subject to self-presentational 
concerns and are based on specific scenarios.  That is, individuals may not provide honest 
responses on self-report measures because of motivations to present themselves in a 
certain light or to meet the expectations of the person distributing the measure (Miller, 
Doob, Butler, & Marlowe, 1965); further, the specific scenarios use particular domain-
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relevant biases as indicators of negativity bias rather than assessing if an overall 
negativity bias is involved in the process of forming attitudes.  However, at least one 
social psychological approach is now available that provides a cleaner test of overall 
negativity bias in attitude formation.  
Fazio, Eiser, and Shook (2004) developed a new technique, a computer “game” 
called BeanFest, to assess attitude formation through associative learning: learning to 
associate a positive or negative valence with an object.  Participants are instructed that 
they will find themselves in an imaginary world of beans, and their goal is to learn which 
beans are good and which beans are bad in order to succeed at the game.  One of the 
unique advantages of this paradigm is that the beans are completely novel targets for 
evaluation.  Participants have no prior knowledge of the beans, so learning and attitude 
formation can be assessed without motivational concerns or prior experience affecting the 
measurement.  The beans vary in appearance (i.e., shape and number of speckles) and 
valence.  In order to prevent participants from easily learning about the bean world, the 
beans were created carefully so that there is not a simple, linear rule (e.g., all circular 
beans are positive) by which participants can associate the appearance of the bean with its 
valence.  To maintain and gain points in the game, participants must learn which 
individual beans are positive and which are negative.  Beans are presented one at a time, 
and participants choose whether to select (approach) or not select (avoid) each bean.  
After participants make their decision, they are provided with feedback informing them 
   
 23 
of the specific bean‟s valence.1  If they chose to select the bean, they earn 10 points if it 
was positively valenced, but they lose 10 points if it was negatively valenced.  If they 
chose not to select the bean, their score remains unchanged.  Half of the beans are 
positive and half are negative.  Thus, all participants, regardless of their game scores, 
experience an equal amount of information about – and equal opportunities to learn – 
positive and negative stimuli.  Specifically, each game bean is presented three times, so 
participants have three opportunities to learn each bean during the game. 
Learning of the valence of each bean is assessed in a test phase after the game 
phase.  During the test phase, individual beans are presented and participants simply 
categorize them according to valence.  No points are involved and no feedback is 
provided.  If participants correctly identify the valence of more negative beans from the 
game than positive beans, this demonstrates negatively biased learning of attitudes: 
learning negative evaluations better than positive evaluations.  Importantly, this specific 
negativity bias has been associated with negative cognitive styles and predisposition to 
depression and anxiety (Shook, Fazio, & Vasey, 2007).   
In addition to beans presented during the game, the test phase also includes beans 
that are systematically similar to the game beans but were not presented in the game; this 
assesses generalization of learned attitudes to similar but novel stimuli.  In their original 
studies, Fazio, Eiser, and Shook (2004) found a robust tendency for individuals to 
generalize negative attitudes to a greater extent than positive attitudes.  Moreover, this 
                                                 
1
 This describes the version of the game that will be used in this study because of its established relevancy 
to the cognitive biases found in those who are predisposed to depression and anxiety (Shook, Fazio, & 
Vasey, 2007).  However, another version of the game does exist in which feedback is contingent upon bean 
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generalization asymmetry was apparent when learning was controlled, so the 
generalization bias was not simply a by-product of negatively biased learning.  
Negatively biased generalization of attitudes, after accounting for the learning bias, has 
also been observed in individuals predisposed to depression and anxiety (Shook & Fazio, 
unpublished data).  Individuals who were more predisposed to depression and anxiety 
tended to exhibit greater generalization of negative attitudes.  In sum, research using 
BeanFest has found that individuals who are predisposed to depression and anxiety learn 
negative attitudes better than positive ones (Shook et al., 2007), and they also are more 
likely to evaluate a similar but unknown target negatively.  In particular, they fail to learn 
to appreciate positive stimuli.  These results provide clean, objective evidence of a 
negativity bias occurring during the process of attitude formation.   
BeanFest may be an especially useful tool for examining the implications of 
mindfulness on cognitive content as it relates to depression and anxiety.  It has been 
proposed here that mindfulness may alter cognitive content so that it is less biased, by 
disengaging from (deactivating) negative schemas and re-directing cognition to a wider, 
more curious observation of current experience.  All aspects of experience, positive and 
negative (or neutral), should be acknowledged as they are.  Such improved objectivity 
could be revealed through more accurate learning and generalization of the valence of 
both positive and negative stimuli within the BeanFest paradigm.  If that were the case, 
this may suggest that mindfulness enables evaluative abilities to be deployed more 
adaptively, rather than in the biased fashion that characterizes depression and anxiety. 
                                                                                                                                                 
selection.  Such a format provides interesting information about exploratory behavior but does not isolate 
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Besides negativity biases related to attitudes, negatively biased attributions, or 
inferences about the causes and implications of events, have also been highlighted as a 
significant part of the negative cognitive style in depression and anxiety (Garratt et al., 
2007; Fresco, Alloy, & Reilly-Harrington, 2006).  Specifically, individuals with 
depression or anxiety tend to attribute negative life events to internal, stable and global 
causes (Fresco et al., 2006).  Such attributions typically are measured using self-report 
instruments that ask participants to imagine themselves in specific scenarios and then to 
indicate the causes and implications.  Although these measures have the same drawbacks 
mentioned for the self-report attitudinal measures, they would provide additional 
evidence of less biased cognition in relation to mindfulness.  The association between 
mindfulness and thoroughness in attending to external information (Herndon, 2008) 
suggests that mindfulness would reduce biases toward internal attributions for negative 
life events.  Combined with the present-moment orientation of mindfulness, this 
increased external encoding should also enable attributions toward temporary and 
context-specific causes rather than stable and global ones.  Thus, there is evidence to 
suggest mindfulness may reduce the attributional biases that characterize depression and 
anxiety.  Demonstrating this would further suggest that mindfulness reduces bias.        
The current research aimed to determine whether reduced negativity bias is a 
feasible mechanism by which mindfulness practices reduce emotional disorders.  Two 
studies were designed to test the link between mindfulness and negativity bias.  
Specifically, the current research examined how mindfulness affected attitude formation 
                                                                                                                                                 
the cognitive bias that is relevant to the current study.  
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in BeanFest as well as self-report measures of attitudes and attributions.  These measures 
were selected to indicate if mindfulness fosters less biased and more adaptive evaluative 
and inferential processes, providing a direct empirical test of the notion that mindfulness 
entails less bias.  This may explain why mindfulness helps to alleviate depression and 
anxiety: It may facilitate a correction of negatively biased cognitive content without 
requiring cognitive elaboration or direct restructuring.  As such, the current work may 
have significant implications for clinical practices and it may also point to additional 
benefits of mindfulness for relating to the self and the social world.         
Present Studies 
 Two studies were conducted to test if mindfulness reduces negatively biased 
cognition.  The first study aimed to establish correlational relations between trait 
mindfulness and the aforementioned measures of bias in attitudes and attributions, with a 
focus on attitude formation.  First, it was predicted that as trait mindfulness increases, 
accuracy in attitude formation (both learning and generalization in BeanFest) would also 
increase.  That is, more mindful individuals would learn negative and positive beans 
more equally (i.e., exhibit less of a negative learning bias) and would exhibit more 
equivalence in generalizing positive and negative attitudes (i.e., exhibit less of a negative 
generalization bias).  As mindfulness was proposed to reduce bias overall, it was not 
expected that mindful individuals would show a reversal of the learning and 
generalization biases (i.e., better learning of positive beans and more generalization of 
positive attitudes).  It was further hypothesized that this increased accuracy in attitude 
formation would mediate inverse relationships between trait mindfulness and both 
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depression and anxiety.  Finally, to provide further support for the proposed relationship 
between mindfulness and reduced biases, mindfulness was also expected to inversely 
correlate with measures of dysfunctional attitudes and attributions that characterize a 
negative cognitive style, which would also mediate the anticipated mindfulness-
emotional disorder relationship. 
 After establishing correlational relationships, an experimental framework 
was used in the second study to test the causal link between mindfulness and reduced 
negativity bias.  A mindfulness-based laboratory induction was compared with a control 
induction for effects on attitude formation and cognitive style.  It was expected that the 
mindfulness condition would show more accurate learning and generalization of object 
valence than the control condition.  Specifically, it was predicted that compared to the 
control condition, individuals in the mindfulness-induction condition would learn 
negative and positive beans more equally (i.e., exhibit less of a negative learning bias, 
without reversing to a positivity bias) and would exhibit more equivalence in generalizing 
positive and negative attitudes (i.e., exhibit less of a negative generalization bias, without 
reversing to a positivity bias).  Effects on the additional measures of negative cognitive 
style, including attitudes and attributions, also were explored.  Again, participants in the 
mindfulness condition were expected to demonstrate less negatively biased processing. 
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CHAPTER 2 Study One 
 
 The purpose of the first study was to demonstrate the associations between 
mindfulness, negativity bias, and emotional disorders.  As this was a first step in 
specifically testing reduced negativity bias as an underlying mechanism to the benefits of 
mindfulness, Study One was correlational in nature.  Negativity bias was measured using 
several cognitive style questionnaires which assessed attitudes and attributions.  In 
addition, the BeanFest paradigm was used as a more covert measure of biased processing 
in attitude formation and attitude generalization.  Emotional disorders were assessed with 
several commonly used depression and anxiety scales.  Finally, two measures of trait 
mindfulness were used.   
It was hypothesized that mindfulness would be inversely correlated with 
negativity bias, positively correlated with accuracy (in BeanFest), and negatively 
correlated with depression and anxiety.  Specifically: 
1. Trait mindfulness was expected to positively correlate with equivalent learning 
and equivalent generalization of positive and negative valences in BeanFest, as this 
would indicate more accurate attitude formation and generalization.  Stated in terms of 
bias, mindfulness was expected to predict less asymmetrical attitude formation and less 
negatively biased generalization of attitudes.   
2. Trait mindfulness was predicted to inversely correlate with negativity biases in 
self-report measures of both attitudes and attributions.  
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3. Trait mindfulness was anticipated to inversely correlate with self-report 
measures of depression and anxiety.   
4. The expected inverse relationship between mindfulness and emotional 
disorders was predicted to be mediated by less negativity bias. 
Method 
Participants 
 A convenience sample of 191 undergraduate psychology students was recruited 
using the university‟s online study recruitment system, Sona.  A power analysis (Cohen, 
1992) based on .80 power, an alpha level of .05, and a medium effect size had determined 
a necessary sample size of 177.  Students participated for extra course credit.  The study 
topic was advertised as “Personality and Games” to conceal the hypotheses and to incite 
interest.  Those under 18 years of age and those who had participated in other studies 
using BeanFest were not eligible to participate.    
 Eight participants‟ data were excluded: three because of technical issues (e.g., 
computer freezing), two who did not speak English sufficiently, and three who did not 
follow directions and take the study seriously (e.g., using the same response key for every 
questionnaire item).  Thus, the final sample size was 183.  Over half of the participants 
were male (59%), and the mean age was 19.4 years (SD = 3.4).  The sample was fairly 
diverse, with 55% identifying as „White,‟ 23% „African American/Black,‟ 11% „Asian,‟ 
7% „Hispanic/Latino,‟ and 7% „Other.‟        
Measures 
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 BeanFest.  Attitude formation and attitude generalization were assessed with 
BeanFest (Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004).  From a participant‟s standpoint, BeanFest 
appears to be a computer game set in an imaginary world of beans that vary in 
appearance.  Participants choose to select or not to select individual beans.  After 
choosing, they see the bean‟s point value: either +10 points (positively valenced) or -10 
points (negatively valenced).  If they selected the bean, then their score – which starts at 
50 points and may range from 0 to 100 points – adjusts accordingly.  If they did not select 
the bean, then their score remains unchanged.    
 The beans differ in shape (circular to oval to oblong) and in number of speckles 
(1-10), as presented by the matrix of 100 possible shape-speckle combinations in Figure 
1.  From this matrix, six regions of beans (36 beans total) were carefully selected for 
inclusion in the game.  The regions were created so that no linear relationship exists 
between the shape or speckles of the bean and its valence.  This ensures that participants 
must learn the valence of each bean individually rather than learning a simple rule that 
would explain the valence of multiple beans.   
 After a practice round in which participants view one bean from each of the six 
regions, participants proceed through three blocks of the game.  In each block, the 36 
game beans are presented individually, in random order.  Whether or not the participant 
selects the bean, feedback about the valence of the bean is provided to ensure equal 
learning opportunities for all 36 beans.  By providing feedback about all beans, 
information gain is not dependent on game behavior and a bias in learning can be 
assessed more purely.  After the game phase is complete, a test phase assesses learning 
   
 31 
and generalization of the valence of the beans.  In this test phase, each of the 100 beans 
from the matrix is presented in random order.  The participant is simply asked to 
categorize the bean as “good” (increases points when selected) or “bad” (decreases points 
when selected).  No feedback is provided during this phase.  Responses to the 36 game 
beans indicate learning.  Responses to the remaining 64 beans indicate generalization to 
similar but novel stimuli. 
 To assess learning biases, the proportion of positive game beans learned correctly 
was subtracted from the proportion of negative game beans learned correctly.  A positive 
difference indicates negatively biased learning.  No bias – equal learning of positives and 
negatives – results in a zero difference.  In addition, each proportion (positive and 
negative beans learned correctly) can be examined to reveal if a learning bias is due to 
exceptional learning of one valence or to poor learning of the other valence.   
To assess the overall generalization bias, positive responses to the novel beans 
were coded as -1, whereas negative responses were coded as +1.  Responses to the 64 
novel beans were averaged to represent overall generalization.  With this coding scheme, 
positive numbers represent greater generalization of negative attitudes, or more negativity 
bias, and negative numbers represent greater generalization of positive attitudes.  
Unbiased generalization is represented by a mean around zero, equivalence between the 
number of novel beans classified as positive and negative.   
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Figure 1. Matrix of shape-speckle combinations and six regions of game beans in 
BeanFest 
 
 
 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988).  Mood state was assessed to ensure that relationships between the variables of 
interest were not due to participants‟ current mood.  This commonly used self-report 
measure is comprised of two subscales that assess two global dimensions of affect, 
positive and negative.  Participants rate each of 20 adjectives (e.g., enthusiastic, 
distressed) using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (very 
much), to indicate the extent to which they are currently experiencing the descriptor.  
Scores for each subscale are totaled, with higher scores indicating higher positive or 
negative affect.  The PANAS has shown good convergent and discriminant validity, test-
retest reliability, and internal consistency (for Study 1, α = .89 for positive affect and α = 
.83 for negative affect; for Study 2, α = .87 for positive affect and α = .86 for negative 
affect). 
Circular 
Oval 
Oblong 
Number of speckles: 1-10 
1: Positive bean   
(+10 points) 
 
-1: Negative bean  
(-10 points) 
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 Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978).  The DAS was 
used as a measure of negative cognitive style.  It is a 64-item self-report measure of 
cognitive distortions based on Beck‟s cognitive theory (1987) of depression.  The items 
represent implicit rules and conditions that involve inflexible or unrealistic standards for 
oneself.  Each statement is rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (totally agree) to 7 
(totally disagree).  Higher scores indicate a greater degree of dysfunctional cognitions.  
Example items include “I should be happy all the time,” and “I am nothing if a person I 
love does not love me.”  The DAS has shown good convergent validity, test-retest 
reliability, and internal consistency (for Study 1, α = .87; for Study 2, α = .91). 
 Looming Maladaptive Style Questionnaire (LMSQ; Riskind, Williams, Theodore, 
Chrosniak, & Cortina, 2000).  This is a measure based on the Looming Vulnerability 
Model (LVM; Riskind, 1997; Riskind, Williams, & Joiner, 2006) of anxiety.  It assesses 
the tendency to create mental representations of potentially threatening situations that are 
rapidly rising in risk or intensifying in danger.  Participants read six short vignettes 
describing potentially stressful situations and then complete three questions for each 
vignette on 5-point scales.  The three questions ask whether the chances of having a 
difficulty seem to be decreasing or expanding with each moment, if the level of threat 
seems fairly constant or is growing rapidly larger with each moment, and how much they 
visualize their problem as not changing or in the act of becoming progressively worse.  
Responses to the three questions for the six vignettes are combined to produce a total 
score.  The LMSQ shows adequate validity, test-retest reliability, and internal consistency 
(for Study 1, α = .70; for Study 2, α = .73). 
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 Future Events Scale (FES; Anderson, 1990).  A final measure of biased cognitive 
processing is comprised of two subscales measuring optimism and pessimism based on 
the perceived likelihood of specific positive and negative future events.  It is composed of 
26 items describing 13 positive events and 13 negative events.  Using an 11-point scale 
ranging from -5 (extremely unlikely) to +5 (extremely likely), participants rate the 
likelihood of each event happening to them at some point in their lives.  Ratings were 
totaled for each subscale.  Higher scores indicate more optimistic or pessimistic outcome 
expectancies, depending on the subscale.  This scale shows good convergent and 
discriminant validity, test-retest reliability, and internal consistency (for Study 1, α =. 88 
for optimism and α = .81 for pessimism; for Study 2, α = .90 for optimism and α =.77 for 
pessimism).  
 Beck Depression Inventory –II (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  The BDI is a 
routinely used self-report measure designed to assess the intensity of affective, cognitive, 
motivational, and physiological symptoms of depression.
2
  It consists of 21 items, each of 
which contains 4 self-evaluative statements that range in intensity on a 4-point scale from 
0 to 3.  For example, an item called “Past Failure” ranges from “I do not feel like a 
failure” (0) to “I feel I am a total failure as a person” (3).  Total scores can range from 0 
to 63.  The BDI-II has good psychometric properties (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996) 
including internal consistency (for Study 1, α = .89).   
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983).  The STAI is a widely 
used self-report instrument that contains two subscales to measure state and trait anxiety.  
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Each subscale consists of 20 items, which are rated on a 4-point scale of intensity for the 
state subscale and a 4-point scale of frequency for the trait subscale.  Participants 
complete the state subscale followed by the trait subscale.  A sample item from the state 
subscale is “I am jittery,” and a sample item from the trait subscale is “I worry too much 
over something that really doesn‟t matter.”  Each subscale shows good internal 
consistency (for Study 1, α = .91 for the trait subscale and α = .92 for the state subscale; 
for Study 2, α = .92 for the state subscale) 
 Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988).  The BAI is 
a unidimensional self-report measure of trait anxiety.  It was developed specifically to 
measure severity of anxiety and to discriminate anxiety from depression.  The inventory 
consists of 21 items stating common symptoms of anxiety (e.g., terrified, hands 
trembling), which are rated on 4-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (severely).  
Total scores can range from 0 to 63.  The BAI shows adequate validity and internal 
consistency (for Study 1, α = .90). 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003).  The MAAS 
is a unidimensional self-report measure of present-moment oriented attention and 
awareness.  It contains 15 items scored on a 6-point scale from 1 (almost always) to 6 
(almost never).  Example items include: “I find it difficult to stay focused on what‟s 
happening in the present” and “I find myself doing things without really paying 
attention.”  Item scores are totaled; higher mean scores reflect higher mindfulness.  This 
widely used scale shows adequate psychometric properties such as convergent and 
                                                                                                                                                 
2
 The BDI includes items that indicate suicidal intentions.  Participants who reported such intentions were 
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discriminant validity as well as test-retest reliability and internal consistency (for Study 1, 
α = .91; for Study 2, α =.84). 
 Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHILMS; Cardaciotto et al., 2008).  The 
PHILMS is a bidimensional self-report measure of present-moment awareness and 
acceptance, or receptivity, toward experiences.  It contains 20 items, 10 per component, 
rated on a 5-point scale from 1 (never) to 5 (very often).  An example item from the 
awareness subscale is “When I walk outside, I am aware of smells or how the air feels 
against my face.”  An example item from the acceptance subscale is “I tell myself that I 
shouldn‟t have certain thoughts.”  Scores are totaled, yielding a total mindfulness score 
and scores for each subscale.  Higher mindfulness is indicated by higher total scores, and 
higher awareness and acceptance are indicated by higher scores on each respective 
subscale.  This recently developed measure shows a strong two-factor solution, adequate 
convergent and discriminant validity, and respectable internal consistency for both 
subscales (for Study 1, α = .81 for awareness and α =.86 for acceptance).  
 Demographics.  Demographic information describing the sample was collected, 
including gender, age, marital status, ethnicity, and religious affiliation.  Additionally, 
participants were asked to report the amount of time they had spent practicing 
mindfulness meditation, transcendental meditation, yoga, tai chi, and similar practices.  
Procedure 
 Participants were greeted by an experimenter and told that they would be 
participating in a study on personality and games.  Up to six participants completed a 
                                                                                                                                                 
identified and promptly referred to counseling.  This limit to confidentiality was stated in the consent form. 
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session at one time, but they were seated at individual computer cubicles and did not 
interact.  Informed consent was obtained by the experimenter before proceeding with the 
study procedures.  Then, participants completed the BeanFest game and the 
questionnaires.  All instructions, measures, and debriefing statements were administered 
on Dell Optiplex 745 computers, using the programs Inquisit and MediaLab.  At the end 
of the session, participants were informed of the study‟s true purpose.  Any questions 
were answered and the participants were thanked and dismissed.   
Results 
 
Preliminary analyses 
 
Initial inspections of the data revealed six outliers: one for the Negative Affect 
subscale of the PANAS, one for the BDI, one for the BAI, one for the Pessimism 
subscale of the FES, and two for the Optimism subscale of the FES.  Comparisons of the 
5% trimmed mean to the overall mean for each of variables determined that these values 
significantly affected the mean, so they were excluded.  After excluding these values, the 
distributions for all variables were normal. 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations and ranges, for all 
variables of interest can be found in Table 1.  Measures of central tendency and 
variability for the affective, cognitive style, and mindfulness measures were consistent 
with previous findings. 
For the BeanFest data, a phi coefficient between bean valence and test-phase 
categorization was calculated for each participant to indicate how well he or she learned 
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the valence of the game beans.  The mean phi coefficient was .19 (SD =.26), which was 
significantly different from zero, t(182) = 9.98, p < .001, indicating that overall the 
participants did learn.  The percent of positive beans correct (M =.59, SD =.15) and 
percent of negative beans correct (M =.60, SD =.18) both were significantly greater than 
chance (50 percent), t(181) = 7.88, p < .001 for percent positive correct and t(181) = 7.44, 
p < .001 for percent negative correct.  The difference between these two indices – that is, 
the learning asymmetry – was .01, which a t-test showed to be equivalent to a zero 
difference, t(181) = .73, p = .47.  Previous research (e.g., Fazio et al., 2004, study 2) 
based on the version of BeanFest used here (which provided feedback on bean valence 
after each trial) also has found nonsignificant learning asymmetries.  Such experiments 
still found significant generalization asymmetries; similarly, the mean generalization 
asymmetry here of .03 (SD = .23) showed a marginally significant difference from zero, 
t(182) = 1.96, p =  .051.   
It should be noted that learning, as indicated by the mean phi coefficient and 
percents positive and negative correct, was lower in the current sample than in previous 
experiments.  For comparison, previous research (Shook et al., 2007) using this version 
of BeanFest found a mean phi coefficient of .41 and percents positive and negative 
correct of .67 and .73, respectively.  Further examination of the present data revealed that 
30 percent of the sample had phi coefficients of zero or less, indicating no or incorrect 
learning.  Potential reasons for this relatively low learning will be explored in the 
discussion. 
   
 39 
Table 1   
 
Means, standard deviations, and ranges for all variables of interest (Study 1) 
 
Variable Mean SD  Range 
 
BeanFest indices 
   
     Learninga .19 .26 1.24 
     Percent positive correct .59 .15 .83 
     Percent negative correct .60 .18 .89 
     Learning asymmetry
b
 .01 .22 1.44 
     Generalization asymmetry
c
 .03 .23 1.30 
Cognitive style measures    
     DAS 121.90 26.96 129.00 
     LMSQ 56.30 9.10 62.00 
     FES – Optimism subscale 26.15 16.07 83.00 
     FES – Pessimism subscale -6.69 18.48 92.00 
Affect measures    
     PANAS – positive affect subscale 25.17 8.27 37.00 
     PANAS – negative affect subscale 16.42 5.61 25.00 
     BDI 12.46 9.11 42.00 
     BAI 13.38 9.70 44.00 
     STAI – trait subscale 42.06 11.39 51 
     STAI – state subscale 40.11 11.68 54 
Mindfulness measures    
     MAAS 3.89 .98 5.00 
     PHILMS (Total) 65.31 9.41 57.00 
           Awareness subscale 36.46 6.44 28.00 
           Acceptance subscale 28.85 7.64 40.00 
 
DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; LMSQ = Looming Maladaptive Style Questionnaire; FES = Future Events 
Scale; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; BDI – Beck Depression Inventory II; STAI = State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; PHILMS = 
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale 
 
aPhi coefficient between actual valence of bean and participant‟s classification of the bean during the test phase. 
 
bLearning asymmetry: Proportion negative correct minus proportion positive correct; reflects bias in attitude formation 
 
cGeneralization asymmetry: Number classified negative minus number classified positive; reflects bias/accuracy in 
generalization 
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Correlations: BeanFest indices and affective and cognitive style measures 
Zero-order correlations between the BeanFest indices and the affective and 
cognitive style measures are shown in Table 2.  The BeanFest indices all correlated 
significantly with one another, as anticipated.  Those who reported more negative affect 
on the PANAS and state anxiety on the STAI exhibited poorer learning in BeanFest.  
Unexpectedly, percent negative correct was inversely associated with negative affect as 
well as with dysfunctional attitudes.  Moreover, contrary to past findings, no other 
significant correlations were found between the BeanFest indices and the affective or 
cognitive style measures.
3
     
Correlations: BeanFest indices and mindfulness measures 
Nonetheless, two interesting correlations emerged in the correlational analysis of 
the BeanFest indices and the mindfulness measures (see Table 2).  Overall learning was 
positively associated with mindfulness as measured by the MAAS.
4
  That is, more 
mindful individuals learned bean valences better.  MAAS scores also correlated 
significantly with percent positive correct, suggesting that better learning may have been 
due to greater learning of positives. Similarly, the correlation between the PHILMS and 
percent positive correct was marginally significant.  These associations provide initial 
support for the idea that mindfulness enables greater attention to positively valenced 
stimuli.   
                                                 
3
 Partial correlations controlling for learning also did not replicate past relationships between these 
measures. 
4
 Controlling for negative affect, the MAAS trended toward significant correlations with learning and 
percent positive correct. 
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Table 2 
 
Zero-order correlations between BeanFest indices and cognitive style, affective, and 
mindfulness measures (Study 1) 
 
 Learning Percent 
positive 
correct 
Percent 
negative 
correct 
Learning 
asymmetry 
Generalization 
asymmetry 
Affect 
     
     Positive affect .04    .10 -.03 -.10 -.10 
     Negative affect -.21** -.08 -.22** -.13
†
 -.06 
     BDI -.12
†
 -.11 -.08 .01 .02 
     BAI -.10 -.07 -.07 -.01 .00 
     STAI Trait -.14 -.14 -.06 .05 .12 
     STAI State -.23** -.16
†
 -.16
†
 -.03 .06 
Cognitive style      
     DAS -.14
†
 -.02 -.16* -.11 -.10 
     LMSQ -.06 -.08 -.02 .04 -.01 
     FES Optimism -.11 -.10 -.07 .01 -.01 
     FES Pessimism -.03 -.03 -.01 .03 .03 
Mindfulness      
     MAAS .15* .16* .08 -.04 .07 
     PHILMS Total .09 .13
†
 .02 -.07 -.03 
          Awareness subscale .00 .03 -.01 -.03 -.02 
          Acceptance subscale .11 .13 .03 -.06 -.02 
BeanFest indices      
     Learning      
     Percent positive correct .70** -- -- -- -- 
     Percent negative correct .82** .16* -- -- -- 
     Learning asymmetry .20** -.57** .73** -- -- 
     Generalization asymmetry .30** -.16* .52** .55** -- 
 
†
 p < .10, *  p < .05, **  p < .01 
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Correlations: Affective and cognitive style measures 
Table 3 contains the zero-order correlations between the cognitive style and 
affective measures.  As expected, the measures of negative cognitive style (the DAS, 
LMSQ and FES Pessimism subscale) all correlated positively.  These measures also 
inversely correlated with optimism as measured by the FES.  
As in past studies, the BDI, BAI, and STAI were highly correlated with each 
other.  Also as anticipated, these measures positively correlated with the measures of 
negative cognitive style and inversely correlated with the FES Optimism subscale.   
All of these relationships remained significant when controlling for state affect. 
Correlations: Mindfulness, affective, and cognitive style measures 
Table 3 also lists the zero-order correlations between the mindfulness measures 
and the cognitive style and affective measures.  In line with previous studies, the 
depression and anxiety measures were inversely associated with both measures of 
mindfulness (except that the BDI and STAI showed no relationship with the Awareness 
subscale of the PHILMS).   
Supporting the hypotheses, measures of negative cognitive style inversely 
correlated with measures of mindfulness.  Mindfulness measures also showed positive 
correlations with the FES Optimism subscale.   
Controlling for state affect did not alter the above relationships. 
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Table 3 
 
Zero-order correlations between affective, cognitive style, and mindfulness measures (Study 1) 
 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Affective measures              
1. Positive affect .07 -.14
†
 -.12
†
 -.32** -.25**  -.18* -.16* .26** -.23** .08 .28** .13
†
 .23** 
2. Negative affect -- .39** .35** .43** .54** .42** .16* -.20** .21** -.23** -.22** -.02 -.25** 
3. BDI -- -- .92** .73** .63** .30** .27** -.33** .31** -.47** -.46** -.13
†
 -.45** 
4. BAI -- -- -- .66** .66** .22** .20** -.33** .28** -.48** -.42** -.15* -.40** 
5. STAI Trait -- -- -- -- .78** .41** .39** -.46** .43** -.47** -.60** -.15
†
 -.57** 
6. STAI State      .38** .28** -.43** .42** -.52** -.48** -.16
†
 -.44 
Cognitive style measures    --          
7. DAS -- -- -- -- --  .20** -.33** .29** -.29** -.36** -.13
†
 -.33** 
8. LMSQ -- -- -- -- --  -- -.20** .30** -.18* -.26** .02 -.34** 
9. FES Optimism -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -.49** .25** .34** .32** .16* 
10. FES Pessimism -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -- -.33** -.33** -.04 -.38* 
Mindfulness measures    --          
11. MAAS -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -- -- .56** .23** .49** 
12. PHILMS Total -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -- -- -- .59** .73** 
13. PHILMS Awareness -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -- -- -- -- .59** 
14. PHILMS Acceptance -- -- -- -- --  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
†
  p < .10, * p < .05, **  p < .01 
4
3
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Mediational analysis 
The mediational analysis tested whether the inverse relationship between the 
mindfulness and depression/anxiety measures could be accounted for by the negative 
cognitive style measures, while controlling for state affect.  (Because the BeanFest 
indices did not significantly correlate with the depression and anxiety measures, these 
were not included in the mediational analysis.)   
For ease of presentation and considering the strong correlations among the three 
categories of questionnaires, composite variables for mindfulness, negative cognitive 
style, and depression/anxiety were computed as the mean of standardized scores on the 
relevant measures.
5
 To meet the conditions for mediation, three relationships were 
necessary and found among the composite variables: (1) mindfulness correlated 
(inversely) with depression/anxiety, r(177) = -.46, p < .001, (2) mindfulness correlated 
(inversely) with negative cognitive style, r(177) = -.39, p < .001, and (3) negative 
cognitive style correlated with depression/anxiety, r(177) = -.30, p < .001.  All of these 
relationships accounted for state affect.  Given that the conditions for mediation were 
met, the next step was to test the relationship between mindfulness and 
depression/anxiety controlling for negative cognitive style (as well as state affect) to 
examine if doing so reduced the magnitude of the relationship.  Accounting for negative 
cognitive style did decrease the magnitude of the correlation between mindfulness and 
depression/anxiety scores, r(177) = -.39, p < .001.  Although the partial correlation 
remained significant, a Sobel‟s test (Baron & Kenny, 1986) revealed that the decrease 
                                                 
5
 The same results also were found using the individual measures. 
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was significant, z = -3.36, p < .001.  Thus, the inverse relationship between mindfulness 
and depression/anxiety measures was partially mediated by negative cognitive style.  The 
mediation model and results are depicted in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Mediation model and analysis (Study 1)  
 
 
 
Discussion 
 The first study aimed to link greater mindfulness to less negativity bias on 
measures of attitude formation and negative cognitive style, and to examine if less 
negativity bias explains the inverse relationship between mindfulness and emotional 
distress.  Trait mindfulness was associated with overall learning in the BeanFest game 
and specifically with learning positively valenced information, or forming positive 
attitudes.  This provides initial support for the hypothesis that mindfulness is associated 
with less negativity bias.  More support was found from the correlations between trait 
Mindfulness Depression/anxiety 
Negative cognitive 
style 
r = -.39 r = .30 
r = -.46 (pr = -.39) 
Sobel‟s z = -3.36, p < .001 
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mindfulness and negative cognitive style.  Not only did mindfulness inversely correlate 
with all measures of negative cognitive style, this relationship partially accounted for the 
inverse association between mindfulness and emotional distress.  That is, part of the 
reason that those who were higher in mindfulness reported less depression and anxiety 
appears to be that they experienced less negativity bias in cognition.  Of course, other 
factors also must be considered to fully explain the relationship between mindfulness and 
emotional disturbance.  Nonetheless, these initial findings suggest that cognitive content 
does differ for more and less mindful individuals.   
 Interestingly, trait mindfulness not only was associated with forming positively 
valenced attitudes but also was positively associated with optimism and negatively 
associated with pessimism.  Together, these findings could indicate a positivity bias, 
which would run counter to the prediction that mindfulness is less biased overall (neither 
negatively nor positively biased).  Inverse correlations with BeanFest learning and 
generalization asymmetries would have provided the clearest indication of positivity bias, 
but these were not found.
6
  Unfortunately, because learning in BeanFest was relatively 
low and past findings were not replicated, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from 
these data.  One potential reason for the low learning may be that the data were collected 
at the end of the semester when student-participants may be less intrinsically motivated 
and more fatigued as they rush to complete multiple experimental sessions by the end of 
the semester.     
                                                 
6
 Additionally, no correlations were found with absolute values of the learning and generalization 
asymmetries.  The absolute values indicate the degree of any bias, positive or negative.   
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 Nonetheless, Study One did provide correlational evidence that trait mindfulness 
is associated with less negativity bias, and it raised questions about a possible positivity 
bias.  Study Two extended this research by testing experimentally if mindfulness causes a 
reduction in negativity bias.  The second study also allowed for the BeanFest paradigm to 
be administered again, throughout the semester, to assess if mindfulness reduces 
negativity bias in attitude formation and whether or not it leads to positivity bias.   
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CHAPTER 3 Study Two 
 
 
The second study used a between-groups experiment to test for a causal 
relationship between mindfulness and negativity bias.  The goal of the study was to 
determine whether a mindful state would reduce negativity biases in attitude formation 
and generalization.  Specifically, a laboratory induction of mindfulness was compared to 
an unfocused attention induction to test for reduced bias in attitude formation and 
generalization within the BeanFest paradigm.  Originally, it was predicted that the 
mindfulness induction condition would demonstrate less biased learning and, thus, 
exhibit more equivalence in formation and generalization of positive and negative 
attitudes as compared to a control condition.  However, there was also the potential that 
participants in the mindfulness condition would demonstrate a positivity bias.  In Study 
One, more mindful participants tended to learn positive stimuli in the BeanFest game 
better than less mindful participants, and they reported higher levels of optimism on the 
Future Events Scale.  Thus, it was possible that individuals in the mindfulness induction 
condition would learn positive beans better than negative beans.  Cognitive style 
questionnaires from Study One also were included and the effects of the mindfulness 
manipulation on these measures was explored.   
Method 
Participants 
 As in Study One, undergraduate psychology students participated for extra course 
credit, and were recruited using the university‟s online study recruitment system.  The 
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study topic again was advertised as “Personality and Games.”  Those under 18 years of 
age and those who had participated in other studies using BeanFest were not eligible to 
participate.  
 The target sample size was 150. A power analysis (Cohen, 1992) based on .80 
power, an alpha level of .05, and a medium effect size determined a necessary sample 
size of 128. The target was higher to account for potential exclusions.  Due to atypically 
slow recruitment, the total sample size was 122.  Nine exclusions were made: Three were 
due to technical issues (using the wrong keyboard keys; computer restart), one was 
confrontational and asked to leave, and the other four did not follow directions and take 
the study seriously (e.g., using the same response key for every questionnaire item).  
Thus, the final sample was comprised of 113 participants (51.3% female) with an average 
age of 19.91 (SD = 2.66).  Thirty-nine % identified as „White,‟ 30% identified as 
„Black/African-American,‟ 18% identified as „Asian,‟ 4% identified as „Hispanic/Latino,‟ 
and the remaining 9% identified as „Other.‟       
Manipulation 
The experimental condition received instructions adapted from those used 
previously (Arch & Craske, 2006; Segal et al., 2002) to induce an approximation of a 
mindful state.  These instructions tell participants that they are going to practice a process 
to help them perceive things in a way that is deeply aware of the present instant.  Initial 
instructions encourage participants to assume a comfortable, erect position in their chairs 
and to gently guide their awareness to the current sensations in their bodies as they sit.  
The instructions then guide participants to anchor their attention on the qualities of each 
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breath as it occurs, without trying to control the breath but simply experiencing it as it is 
in that moment with a sense of curiosity and patience if possible.  Additional instructions 
guide participants to register and accept any thoughts or feelings as they occur – 
acknowledging them without dwelling on them.  If they notice that their mind has 
wandered, which tends to happen, they are to acknowledge that with a sense of self-
congratulation for reconnecting to the present moment.  Reminders and variations of 
these instructions are repeated periodically throughout the 15-minute instructional period.   
The control condition received instructions on unfocused attention adapted from 
Arch and Craske (2006).  These instructions tell participants that they are going to 
practice a process to perceive things in a way that lets their mind wander freely.  They are 
told to simply think about whatever comes to mind, and to let their mind wander freely 
without trying to focus on anything in particular.  Close variants of these instructions are 
repeated throughout the 15-minute instructional period at the same time intervals used in 
the mindfulness induction instructions. 
Both sets of instructions were pilot tested prior to the start of Study Two, with a 
state version of the MAAS administered afterward as a manipulation check.  The state 
MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003) includes 5 items from the larger trait MAAS measure, 
slightly rephrased to assess state mindfulness.  The items were selected for the state scale 
based on their applicability to a variety of situations.  The state MAAS has shown good 
predictive and construct validity.  It also has demonstrated internal reliability (α = .92) 
when repeated measures were collapsed across time in previous research (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003), based on its small number of items. This manipulation check was performed 
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only during pilot testing to avoid exposing the control participants to potential cues to be 
mindful during the actual experiment.  A t-test was used to compare the two conditions 
on the state MAAS and confirmed that the mindfulness induction condition scored higher 
(M = 3.50, SD = .88) than the control condition (M = 2.50, SD = .48), t(18) =  3.31, p = 
.004.   
Procedure & Measures 
 Similar to Study One, participants were greeted by an experimenter and told that 
they would be participating in a study on personality and games.  Again, up to six 
participants attended a session at one time, seated at individual computer cubicles.  After 
the experimenter obtained informed consent, the participants were randomly assigned to 
either the experimental (mindfulness) or control condition.  All participants in one 
session were assigned to the same condition to maintain a consistent environment and 
avoid potential distractions.  Both conditions received 15 minutes of pre-recorded 
instructions that they listened to on individual headphones. 
Immediately following the instructional period, all participants completed most of 
the measures from Study One, again administered via computer using Inquisit and 
MediaLab.  First, the PANAS was used to assess any post-induction differences in mood 
state between the two conditions and as a potential correlate with the BeanFest measures.  
Next, participants played the BeanFest game as it was described in Study One.  The 
BeanFest indices served as the primary dependent measures.  State anxiety, which could 
be related to performance in BeanFest and/or an alternate explanation for results, was 
then measured, followed by measures of cognitive style.  The cognitive style measures 
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served as secondary dependent variables, given that the duration of the induced mindful 
state was unknown.  State anxiety was assessed using the state subscale of the STAI.  The 
measures of cognitive style included the DAS, LMSQ, and FES.  Participants completed 
a measure of trait mindfulness, the MAAS, and the same demographic questions used in 
Study One, so that any differences between groups on these measures could be 
statistically controlled for (or further investigated) if warranted.  Additionally, four 
questions were used to assess the extent to which the participant complied with the 
manipulation and BeanFest instructions.  The two questions concerning manipulation 
compliance were: “To what extent did you follow the instructions during the audio 
recording at the beginning of this study?” and “How difficult or easy was it to follow the 
instructions during the audio recording?” which were correlated, r(111) = .37, p < .001.  
The two questions for BeanFest compliance were: “To what extent did you follow the 
instructions during the BeanFest game?” and “To what extent did you try to learn if the 
beans were helpful or harmful based on their appearance (their shape and/or speckles)?” 
which also were correlated, r(111) = .44, p < .001.   Participants indicated their responses 
using 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Completely), except for the 
second manipulation question that ranged from 1 (Difficult) to 5 (Easy).  Composite 
scores were created for manipulation compliance and BeanFest compliance by summing 
the scores for the two questions that pertained to each form of compliance. Trait 
measures of depression or anxiety were not expected to be affected by the brief induction.  
Hence, these trait measures were excluded.  After completing the study procedures, 
participants were fully debriefed, thanked and dismissed.   
   
 53 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Initial inspections of the data revealed five outliers: two for the NA subscale of 
the PANAS, one for the LMSQ, and two for the Optimism subscale of the FES.  
Comparisons of the 5% trimmed mean to the overall mean for each of these variables 
determined that these values significantly affected the mean, so they were excluded.  
After excluding these values, the distributions for all variables were acceptably normal. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations and ranges, for all 
variables of interest can be found in Table 4.  Measures of central tendency and 
variability for the affective, cognitive style, and mindfulness measures for the full sample 
again were consistent with previous findings. 
For the BeanFest data for the full sample, the mean phi coefficient (indicating 
learning) was .21 (SD =.29), which was significantly different from zero, t(112) = 7.96, p 
< .001, indicating that overall the participants did learn and perhaps slightly better than in 
Study One.  The overall percent of positive beans correct (M =.61, SD =.17) and percent 
of negative beans correct (M =.60, SD =.20) both were significantly greater than chance 
(50 percent), t(112) = 6.59, p < .001 for percent positive correct and t(112) = 5.34, p < 
.001 for percent negative correct.  The learning asymmetry (the difference between 
percents positive and negative correct) was -.01 (SD = .24), which a t-test showed to be 
equivalent to a zero difference, t(112) = -.39, p = .697.  The mean generalization 
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asymmetry of .06 (SD = .29) was significantly different from zero, t(112) = 2.18, p =  
.031, indicating an overall negativity bias in generalization. 
Table 4   
 
Means, standard deviations, and ranges for all variables of interest (Study 2) 
 
Variable Mean SD  Range 
BeanFest indices    
     Learning .21 .29 1.24 
     Percent positive correct .61 .17 .83 
     Percent negative correct .60 .20 .78 
     Learning asymmetry -.01 .24 1.53 
     Generalization asymmetry .06 .29 1.87 
Cognitive style measures    
     DAS 118.58 28.77 162 
     LMSQ 55.93 9.01 45 
     FES – Optimism subscale 27.76 16.06 80.00 
     FES – Pessimism subscale -1.21 17.75 95.00 
Affect measures    
     PANAS – positive affect subscale 28.24 7.95 40.00 
     PANAS – negative affect subscale 15.14 5.41 26.00 
     STAI – state subscale 40.31 11.66 56 
Mindfulness measures    
     MAAS 3.51 .76 4.00 
 
Tests of Confounds 
 T-tests were used to examine if the conditions differed on trait mindfulness and 
state affect.  This was important to rule out these variables as potential alternate 
explanations.  The conditions did not differ on trait mindfulness, t(111) = .019, p = .985.  
The conditions also did not differ on state affect as measured by the PANAS [for PA, 
t(111) = -1.44, p = .152; for NA, t(111) = 1.01, p = .317] and the STAI (state subscale 
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only) [t(111) = 1.30, p = .196].  The groups also did not differ on any demographic 
variables (ps > .30).  
Tests of Covariates  
 Zero-order correlations were computed to examine if BeanFest compliance and 
state affect were related to learning and generalization in BeanFest, the dependent 
measures in the tests of the primary hypothesis.  Unsurprisingly, BeanFest compliance 
was significantly correlated with learning, r(111) = .32, p < .001, percent negative 
correct, r(111) = .41, p < .001, and generalization asymmetry, r(111) = .37, p < .001.  
Learning also correlated with state affect; specifically, there was a positive correlation 
with the PA subscale of the PANAS, r(111) = .23, p = .013, and an inverse correlation 
with the STAI, r(111) = -.29, p = .002.  The generalization asymmetry also inversely 
correlated with the STAI, r(111) = -.22, p = .021.  Based on these correlations, BeanFest 
compliance and state affect (positive affect and state anxiety) were controlled for in tests 
of the primary hypothesis.
7
  Manipulation compliance also was controlled for based on 
the theoretical justification that greater compliance should produce greater effects, and 
vice-versa.      
 In the tests of the secondary hypotheses in which the cognitive style measures 
served as dependent variables, the analyses controlled for manipulation compliance and 
state affect (as measured by the NA subscale of the PANAS and the STAI) because these 
variables were correlated with the dependent variables (see Table 5 for the correlations). 
                                                 
7
 PANAS scores were not controlled for when testing for effects on generalization asymmetry because no 
correlations were found between these measures. 
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Table 5 
 
Correlations between manipulation compliance, affect, and cognitive style measures 
(Study 2) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Manipulation 
compliance 
 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2. PANAS – positive 
affect subscale 
 
.20* -- -- -- -- -- -- 
3. PANAS – 
negative affect 
subscale 
 
-.16
†
 .03 -- -- -- -- -- 
4. STAI -.21* -.38** .51** -- -- -- -- 
5. DAS -.26** -.08 .40** .40** -- -- -- 
6. LMSQ -.17
†
 -.07 .21* .32** .34** -- -- 
7. FES – pessimism 
subscale 
 
-.24* -.13 .30** .36** .44** .18
†
 -- 
8. FES – optimism 
subscale 
.26** .24* -.09 -.34** -.23* -.23* -.26** 
 
†
 p < .10, *  p < .05, **  p < .01  
 
Tests of Primary Hypothesis 
 A 2 (mindfulness or control condition) x 2 (positive or negative bean valence) 
factorial ANCOVA was used to analyze the effect of condition and bean valence on 
percent learned correctly, while controlling for both composite measures of instructional 
compliance (manipulation and BeanFest) as well as state affect (PA and STAI) to ensure 
that effects of these variables were minimized.
8
  There was no main effect of condition, 
                                                 
8
 Assumption testing for the ANCOVAs confirmed homogeneity of the regression slopes for the covariates, 
meaning that they did not interact significantly with the independent variables in their relationships to the 
dependent variable.  The covariates also did not demonstrate multicollinearity with each other.  
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F(1, 107) = .85, p = .360.  Participants in the mindfulness condition did not correctly 
identify more beans than the participants in the control condition.  There also was not a 
main effect of valence, Wilks Lambda = .99, F (1, 107) = .06, p = .814.  As previously 
reported, there was not an overall learning asymmetry.  However, as hypothesized, there 
was a significant interaction between condition and valence on the percent correct, Wilks 
Lambda = .963, F(1, 107) = 4.07, p = .046, partial eta squared = .037.  The interaction is 
depicted in Figure 3.  The adjusted mean learning asymmetry in the control condition was 
.04 (negatively biased) and in the mindfulness condition it was -.06 (positively biased). 
To investigate this interaction further, one-way ANCOVAs were run comparing the 
conditions on percent positive correct and percent negative correct.  The conditions 
significantly differed on percent negative correct, F(1, 107) = 4.17, p = .044.  The 
adjusted means revealed that the mindfulness condition (M = .56, SE =.02) developed 
fewer negative attitudes than the control condition (M = .64, SE =.02). No significant 
differences between the conditions were found for percent positive correct, F(1, 107) = 
.42, p = .517. 
 A one-way ANCOVA was then used to test if the generalization asymmetry 
differed by condition, controlling for instructional compliance and state anxiety as well as 
learning (to assess bias beyond that accounted for by learning).  The difference between 
the conditions was marginally significant, F(1, 107) = 3.30, p = .072.  The control 
condition (adjusted M = .11, SE = .04) demonstrated more negativity bias in 
generalization than the mindfulness condition (adjusted M =.01, SE = .04).  The mean 
                                                                                                                                                 
Additionally, homogeneity of variances was tested using Levene‟s test and homogeneity of 
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generalization asymmetry in the control condition differed significantly from zero [t(56) 
= 2.68, p = .010], whereas the generalization asymmetry in the mindfulness condition 
was essentially the same as a zero difference [t(55) = .56, p = .581].   
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 Figure 3. Interaction between condition and valence on percent correct in BeanFest 
(Study 2) 
 
Tests of Secondary Hypothesis 
 One-way ANCOVAs were used to examine if the cognitive style measures 
differed by condition, controlling for effects of manipulation compliance and state affect 
(state anxiety and negative affect for the DAS, LMSQ, FES Pessimism; state anxiety and 
positive affect for the FES Optimism).  The conditions did not significantly differ on the 
DAS [F(1, 106) = .18, p = .675], the LMSQ [F(1, 105) = .55, p = .461], or the Pessimism 
subscale of the FES [F(1, 106) = .03, p = .854].  However, the conditions did differ 
significantly on the Optimism subscale of the FES, F(1, 106) = 6.07, p = .015.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
intercorrelations was tested using Box‟s M; neither test was significant. 
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mindfulness condition (adjusted M = 31.44; SD = 2.04) demonstrated greater optimism 
than the control condition (adjusted M = 24.14, SD = 2.02). 
Correlations 
 Correlations between trait mindfulness and the negative cognitive style measures 
were determined to examine if they replicated those found in Study One.  Similar, albeit 
somewhat stronger, inverse relationships to those in Study One were found between the 
MAAS and the DAS, LMSQ, and the Pessimism subscale of the FES (rs = -.44, -.36, -
.36, respectively; all ps < .001).   
Discussion 
 The aim of Study Two was to test for a causal relationship between mindfulness 
and reduced negativity bias.  The primary hypothesis was that a mindfulness induction, 
compared to a control condition, would result in less negativity bias in attitude formation 
and generalization as measured in BeanFest.  This was supported by the results.  
However, it was originally hypothesized that mindfulness would reduce bias overall, 
which would produce more equal learning and generalization of positive and negative 
valences rather than reversing to a positivity bias.  Yet, the results of Study One raised 
the possibility that mindfulness might produce a positivity bias.  For learning, or attitude 
formation, in Study Two a positivity bias was indeed found: The mindfulness condition 
formed more positive attitudes relative to negative attitudes as compared to the control 
condition.  Inconsistent with Study One findings, the positivity bias for more mindful 
participants was due to decreased learning of negative game beans, not increased learning 
of positive game beans.  A potential explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that the 
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mindfulness induction might have been taxing for novices and thus dampened their 
learning of positive and negatives.  That is, perhaps learning benefits from the 
mindfulness induction were offset by the effort of the induction.  Overall level of learning 
did not differ between conditions in Study Two, but in Study One learning – and 
specifically positive learning – increased with mindfulness.  If the participants in the 
mindfulness condition had been less taxed, perhaps positive attitude formation would 
have been more pronounced and account more for the positivity bias.  This or other 
differences between trait mindfulness and the brief induction could account for the results 
in the two studies. 
In any case, for attitude generalization, the results trended toward indicating that 
neither a positivity nor negativity bias was evident for the mindfulness condition, 
whereas a negativity bias was evident for the control condition.  These results seem to 
suggest that when an object was associated with a definite valence, mindfulness increased 
attention to and learning of positives over negatives.  However, when an object was not 
definitely associated with a valence, mindfulness decreased bias and led to a more 
egalitarian approach of categorizing novel targets.    
 A tentative, secondary hypothesis was that the mindfulness induction would 
produce less negativity bias on measures of cognitive style when compared to the control 
condition.  For all measures of negative cognitive style, there were no differences 
between the conditions.  It was proposed earlier that the duration of the mindfulness 
induction‟s effects might have been too short to affect these measures.  Yet, the 
mindfulness condition showed higher levels of optimism than the control condition.  It is 
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unlikely that the two conditions differed on optimism prior to the induction because they 
did not differ on any other measure of cognitive style or affect with which optimism 
correlates.  It is possible that the brief mindfulness induction affected only the measure of 
positivity and not the self-report measures of negativity.  Perhaps changes on these 
measures of negative cognitive style require more training or time to emerge.  Trait 
mindfulness correlated inversely with the measures of negative cognitive style, as in 
Study One, but based on this research it is uncertain whether mindfulness would cause 
changes in these measures of negative cognitive style.     
One might wonder why the mindfulness condition reported a more positive 
outlook on the optimism measure but did not generalize positive attitudes in BeanFest.  
Perhaps although the concept of optimism involves generalized positive expectancies, the 
specific scale used here is more similar to the attitude formation task because it involves 
potential scenarios with pre-defined valences that participants have learned from prior 
experience.  That is, they are asked to rate the likelihood that they will experience various 
events which are clearly positive in valence.  Thus, this scale seems to measure emphasis 
placed on known positives, which is more similar to the attitude formation task than the 
attitude generalization task.  The latter differs in that the stimuli to be categorized are 
novel, albeit similar in appearance to previous stimuli, and participants do not receive any 
indication of their valence. If the optimism scale is more similar to the attitude formation 
task, then this reinforces the idea that being more mindful caused participants to give 
more weight to known positives over known negatives but not to extend this bias to 
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unknown stimuli.  This indicates that mindfulness may reduce generalization of the 
valence of a known target to a similar but novel target.       
 Because the conditions did not differ on measures of state affect and the analyses 
controlled for those measures based on their relationships with the dependent variables, 
neither affective valence nor arousal can account for the above findings.  The results are 
also compelling considering that the study‟s power was limited by not reaching the target 
sample size.  Controlling for instructional compliance helped to increase power by 
reducing error variance related to motivational issues and other reasons for reduced 
compliance which may have plagued Study One. 
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CHAPTER 4 General Discussion 
 
The current research proposed and tested the general hypothesis that mindfulness 
reduces bias, specifically negativity bias, and that this may at least partially explain why 
mindfulness reduces or prevents emotional distress.   
The goal of Study One was to establish correlational evidence to support the 
proposed association between trait mindfulness and reduced negativity bias in attitude 
formation and generalization as well as on measures of negative cognitive style.  
Additionally, the proposed mediational role of these reduced negativity biases in the 
inverse relationship between trait mindfulness and predisposition to depression and 
anxiety was tested.  Trait mindfulness was associated with better learning of stimuli 
during the BeanFest game and, more specifically, forming a greater number of positive 
attitudes.  Trait mindfulness also was inversely related to measures of negatively biased 
attitudes and attributions, indicating that those who were more mindful reported less 
negatively biased cognitions.  Further, this lower negativity bias partially accounted for 
the inverse relationship between trait mindfulness and emotional distress (as indicated by 
depression and anxiety inventories).  Thus, the findings from Study One supported the 
initial contentions that those who are more mindful are less negatively biased in their 
cognitive content, and that this contributes to their lower levels of emotional distress.  
However, the unexpected association between mindfulness and positive attitude 
formation and trait optimism raised the possibility that mindfulness was associated with 
less negativity bias not because of a relative lack of bias (i.e., equivalence in attention to 
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and appreciation of positive and negative information) but because of a bias in the 
opposite direction – toward positivity. 
Study Two built on these findings using a randomized, controlled experimental 
design to test for causality.  Participants completed either a mindfulness induction or a 
control exercise, and then they completed measures of attitude formation and 
generalization followed by measures of negative cognitive style.  Overall learning did not 
differ by condition, meaning that participants learned essentially the same number of 
stimuli.  However, participants in the mindfulness condition formed more positive 
attitudes than negative attitudes whereas the reverse was true for participants in the 
control condition.  Given that a full feedback version of the BeanFest game was utilized, 
participants in the two conditions seemed to weight the positive and negative information 
differently. Those in the mindfulness condition also reported significantly more optimism 
than those in the control condition; that is, they perceived a higher likelihood that they 
would experience various positive events in the future.  These findings suggest that 
mindfulness caused participants to be biased toward positivity, rather than less biased as 
initially proposed.  However, this apparent positivity bias may only apply to stimuli with 
a defined valence, considering that a marginally significant trend indicated that 
participants in the mindfulness condition did not demonstrate bias, either positive or 
negative, when generalizing attitudes to novel, ambiguous stimuli (whereas the control 
condition demonstrated a negativity bias).  Together, these findings provide initial 
evidence suggesting that mindfulness may create a bias toward recognizably positive 
stimuli without producing bias when encountering unknown stimuli.     
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It should be noted that in Study Two, the mindfulness induction did not affect 
scores on the measures of negative cognitive style.  However, in both studies trait 
mindfulness was inversely associated with these measures.  With correlational findings, 
there is the potential for bi-directional relationships and effects from third variables.  
Thus, the precise nature of the association between the variables is not truly known.  Still, 
the mindfulness induction did reduce negativity bias in both attitude formation and 
generalization, which supports the possibility that mindfulness does reduce negativity 
bias.  Potentially, the brief induction of mindfulness was not strong or long enough to 
affect the measures of pre-existing negative cognitions, which were administered at the 
end of the sessions.  Indeed, Ramel and colleagues (2004) found that an eight-week 
mindfulness training did lead to improvements in dysfunctional attitudes.  This provides 
some evidence that mindfulness can affect pre-existing negative cognitions with longer 
training.  Perhaps similar positive cognitions can be affected more easily by a brief 
mindfulness training, and this could explain why scores on the measure of optimism were 
affected by the induction.  It is conceivable that mindfulness primarily affects weighting 
of positive information and that this leads to changes in negative cognitions over time.           
The present findings cannot be explained by state affect, including calmness or 
positive affect.  State affect was controlled for in the various analyses, and the 
mindfulness manipulation in Study Two did not result in differences in affect as 
measured by the PANAS or STAI between the two conditions (mindfulness versus 
control).  Moreover, participants in Study Two were randomly assigned to conditions, so 
individual differences such as trait mindfulness and demographics were distributed 
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evenly between the groups.  Given that the manipulation and measures were administered 
using pre-recorded instructions and through a computer program, respectively, any 
unintentional experimenter demand effects were minimized.   
Connections with Previous Research 
The findings from this research concur with and build on previous studies related 
to mindfulness and bias.  As far as negativity bias, the inverse relationship between trait 
mindfulness and dysfunctional attitudes is in accord with Ramel and colleagues‟ (2004) 
finding that a mindfulness-based intervention (MBSR) reduced dysfunctional attitudes.  
The current research added to such findings by demonstrating that trait mindfulness also 
was inversely related to pessimism and the looming maladaptive cognitive style, and that 
a brief mindfulness induction reduced the formation and generalization of negative 
attitudes.  The consistency of the findings across the present two studies and with 
previous research supports the contention that mindfulness can reduce negativity bias.  
Importantly, this is also the first study to test and find that less negatively biased 
cognition partially mediates the inverse relationship between mindfulness and emotional 
distress.         
An intriguing new finding of the current research was a causal link between 
mindfulness and positivity bias.  Previous correlational research has linked trait 
mindfulness with higher levels of optimism (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003).  The current 
studies replicated this finding, and extended such research by showing that a brief 
mindfulness induction caused an increase in optimism.  Of more interest and significance 
are the relations found between mindfulness and the BeanFest indices.  The positivity 
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biases found with BeanFest are most striking because the attitude formation measure has 
not been used previously with mindfulness measures or inductions.  Also, the advantage 
of this specific measure is that it provides a clean, objective standard of the valence of 
stimuli.  That is, stimuli have a set positive, negative, or unspecified valence to which 
participants‟ responses are compared.  There is no interpretation or subjective assessment 
as to the extremity or valence of the stimuli. Thus, the positivity bias in the mindfulness 
conditions means indicates a true ratio of how positives were weighted compared to 
negatives. 
Why a Positivity Bias? 
Originally, it was proposed that mindfulness would reduce bias overall rather than 
promote a bias toward positivity.  However, in both studies, mindfulness was related to a 
bias toward learning positive valences.  This raises questions about why mindfulness 
might increase positivity bias, particularly after a brief induction of mindfulness.  That is, 
it was not a choice or change that developed over time.  Although a relatively small 
number of studies exist on the effects of mindfulness-like inductions, they may be most 
informative to the present research.  The induction used here was similar to that used by 
Arch and Craske (2006), who found that participants who completed the induction 
reported less negative emotion in response to negatively valenced pictures as compared to 
control conditions.  They also were more willing to view aversive pictures.  These 
findings were interpreted as evidence of reduced emotional reactivity or faster recovery.  
Similar conclusions have been drawn from other, related induction studies (e.g. Eifert & 
Heffner, 2003; Levitt et al., 2004), as mentioned previously.  It was argued here 
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previously that the emotional reactivity explanation is somewhat questionable because 
mindfulness-related inductions also have been found to maintain or even increase 
sensitivity to the valence of experiences in the moment (e.g., Cioffi & Holloway, 1993; 
LeBel & Dubé, 2001).  However, another possible explanation is faster recovery.  All of 
the induction studies mentioned here that used negative stimuli showed evidence of 
increased acceptance and faster recovery.  It is possible that mindfulness enables 
individuals to register and then disengage from negative stimuli faster, reducing the 
attentional, cognitive, and/or emotional weight that such stimuli would otherwise 
produce.  Indeed, Ortner and colleagues (2007) found that individuals trained in 
mindfulness disengaged from unpleasant pictures faster than control participants, 
although their study used a longer mindfulness training.  Perhaps this ability frees 
conscious resources to process positive information.   
It is also interesting to consider that mindfulness might increase sensitivity to 
rewards.  LeBel and Dubé (2001) found that a sensory monitoring induction (akin to 
being mindful of sensations), compared to a distraction condition, increased reported 
pleasure while eating chocolate.  Another study (Kiken & Brown, 2008) similarly found 
that a sensory monitoring induction, compared to distraction and control conditions, 
increased reported enjoyment while tasting raisins.  The valences in the BeanFest 
paradigm are related to reward (gaining points) or punishment (losing points), and 
learning to associate the stimuli with the correct consequence.  If mindfulness increases 
sensitivity to the rewarding nature of positive stimuli, while enabling disengagement 
from aversive stimuli, then perhaps this explains why the mindfulness induction caused 
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participants to learn the valence of positive beans better.  In other words, gaining points 
was more enjoyable than losing points and the mindfulness induction may have enabled 
participants to distribute cognitive resources accordingly.   
Yet, the extent of the positivity bias produced by mindfulness in this research 
appeared to be limited to those stimuli with a clearly defined valence.  For 
categorizations of novel, ambiguous stimuli, the mindfulness induction trended toward 
reducing negativity bias without reversing to a positivity bias.  Mindfulness seemed to 
reduce bias overall.  Given that the participants received no information about the valence 
of these stimuli, indicating an equal likelihood of positive or negative valence (as the 
mindfulness condition tended to do) was a more accurate response.  That said, the 
unknown stimuli were similar in appearance to the clearly valenced stimuli to which 
participants were previously exposed.  It is remarkable that the mindfulness condition 
essentially distinguished the new, ambiguous stimuli from the valenced stimuli that they 
had just learned beforehand, particularly given that they categorized 100 total beans.  
This supports the idea that mindfulness is more attuned to present experiences and that it 
can produce less bias when the potential valence of a stimulus is unclear.  Brown and 
colleagues (2007) contend that “When mindful … thoughts are less likely to be colored 
by beliefs, prejudices and other biases that are not supported by objective or experiential 
evidence” (p. 213).  Accordingly, a lack of evidence of a valence associated with a 
stimulus should reduce bias in thoughts about that stimulus when individuals are being 
more mindful.  That is what appears to have been found here in terms of positive and 
negative evaluations.  Another way to phrase this is that mindfulness appeared to reduce 
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overgeneralization of both positive and negative attitudes.  This is important to consider, 
as many biases including those in emotional disorders involve generalizing negativity 
from something that is actually negative to something similar that is not necessarily 
negative (e.g., Alloy et al., 2000; 2006). 
Likewise, the present findings, although preliminary, have implications for 
multiple aspects of emotional distress and disorder.  First, a reason that mindfulness 
reduces rumination (Ramel et al., 2004; Jain et al., 2007) could be that negativity is not 
generalized beyond the actual source.  Further, less weight may be given to clearly 
negative experiences and more weight may be given to clearly positive experiences.  
With both of these processes, there might be less to ruminate about.  This exemplifies 
how mindfulness may affect thought content by altering the mental context.  Receptive, 
present-moment attention may reduce generalization, which may be aided by or a result 
of the reduced elaboration on thoughts and feelings described by Segal and colleagues 
(2002).  They also suggested that reduced elaboration could help shift cognitive resources 
away from known negatives, accepting them and letting them go, to known positives, 
which could be accepted and appreciated more.  For those who increase their exposure to 
or level of mindfulness over time, pre-existing negatively biased cognitions might be 
reduced as the study by Ramel and colleagues (2004) found for dysfunctional attitudes.  
When negative cognitions do arise, they may be recovered from more easily, receiving 
less emphasis and generalizing less.   
This aligns with explanations of how mindfulness-based interventions such as 
MBCT may prevent the recurrence of depression and reduce anxiety, as well as with 
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traditional cognitive theories of these disorders.  Recall that the aims of mindfulness-
based interventions relate to cognitive context whereas the aims of CT involve cognitive 
content, despite the potential that both approaches could conceivably affect context and 
content.  It was proposed earlier, based on schema modification models described by 
Hollon and colleagues (1993), that the process of each approach may differ.  
Mindfulness-based interventions may deactivate negatively biased schemas (by reducing 
elaboration) and reinforce compensatory schemas (receptively attending to present events 
and experiences).  CT may engage and directly change negatively biased schemas so that 
they accommodate other perspectives and beliefs.  This may be a more active cognitive 
process that involves evaluating thoughts and therefore more cognitive elaboration than 
mindfulness-based approaches.  It was proposed that the context of mindfulness could 
result in cognitive changes without actively engaging and testing cognitions, because 
mindfulness itself might entail a less biased approach.  The current findings suggest that 
this could be at least partly true.  Mindfulness did change thought content in the current 
research, for attitude formation and generalization as well as the perceived likelihood of 
positive events occurring, without any active effort or aim to change thoughts.  Thoughts 
either became more positive than negative, or less biased toward either valence, 
depending on whether the task involved defined or ambiguous valences.  According to 
CT, such cognitive changes facilitate improvements in depression and anxiety (Garratt et 
al., 2007).  Thus, even though mindfulness-based approaches do not focus on cognitive 
content, changes in cognitive content may be key to the effectiveness of these 
approaches.  At the same time, they may add to traditional CT by teaching a mental skill 
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that reduces the need to actively engage in cognitive restructuring.  Of course, these are 
speculations on the implications of the current findings as they relate to existing theory 
and research on therapeutic interventions, so they require more empirical validation.    
Limitations 
While many compelling implications and questions arise from the current 
findings, there are limitations to this research.  First, the operationalizations of 
mindfulness should be considered.  The mindfulness induction in Study Two was a 15-
minute training with novices.  Thus, it may have only approximated a mindful state.  A 
fuller or truer state of mindfulness might have produced different results, which may 
account for inconsistencies between the two studies (e.g., mindfulness correlating with 
increased learning of positive game beans in Study One, whereas the mindfulness 
condition differed in learning of negative game beans in Study Two).  Still, it is 
interesting and powerful that the brief induction with novices had the effects that it did.  
It also should be noted that Study One relied on two self-report measures of trait 
mindfulness, and some disagreement does exist over which, if any, of the self-report 
scales best assess the construct.  However, both scales used have been tested for validity 
and reliability, and the MAAS has been especially well-tested and widely used compared 
to other mindfulness scales.  Further, non-self-report measures of mindfulness have not 
been definitively established.      
Because Study One was cross-sectional, the meditation model was not tested with 
data that could account for temporal order as would be possible with longitudinal data.  
Although reduced negativity bias partially accounted for the inverse correlation between 
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trait mindfulness and emotional distress, it was not demonstrated that mindfulness 
preceded cognitive changes or that cognitive changes preceded emotional distress 
outcomes.  One might contend that reduced emotional distress accounts for changes in 
cognition.  In Study Two, mindfulness did not produce significant differences in affect 
and still reduced negativity bias on certain cognitive measures, although it did not reduce 
negativity bias on the cognitive style measures used in the meditational analyses in Study 
One.  It has been proposed here based on a previous study that longer training may be 
needed to produce changes on the cognitive style measures.  Additionally, previous 
longitudinal and experimental studies do support that changes in negatively biased 
cognitions precede improvements in symptoms of depression and anxiety (Alloy et al., 
2000, 2006; Garratt et al., 2007).  Thus, the mediation model tested in Study One has 
some justification and provides a testable framework for future research.     
Generalizability of the current findings should also be considered.  First, the 
undergraduate samples, although diverse, may not necessarily represent the typical adult 
population.  They were not clinical samples, either, so the results here might not 
generalize to clinical populations.  Additionally, the BeanFest paradigm is a simple, static 
world whereas real life is complex and dynamic.  However, the aim of these studies was 
to demonstrate that mindfulness could reduce bias, and the BeanFest paradigm provided a 
clear, objective measure of this.  Similarly, generalizability to certain populations was not 
a main concern of this research because it aimed to provide an initial experimental test of 
a basic research question, to provide a basis for future studies that can better address 
generalizability and applied relevance.  
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However, the Study One sample was of some concern as far as overall levels of 
motivation or comprehension of some of the BeanFest instructions.  Based on the 
relatively low levels of learning in BeanFest and anecdotal reports from experimenters of 
low motivation, this may explain the failure to replicate past correlations between the 
BeanFest measures and the measures of cognitive style and emotional disorders.  The 
undergraduate population at this university may differ from the undergraduate 
populations used in previous studies with BeanFest, either in terms of their motivation or 
other factors.  Study Two attempted to account for this to some degree by asking 
participants to report honestly on their compliance with the manipulation and BeanFest.  
More research is being planned to investigate potential differences in the populations and 
to increase motivation and instructional clarity. 
Future Directions 
Future research is needed to replicate the current findings, as they are preliminary 
despite the various potential explanations and implications posed here.  Replications 
could use other samples and incorporate additional or different measures of negativity 
and positivity biases.  Longitudinal research would be helpful for examining the effects 
of longer mindfulness training on cognitive biases and to test the temporal order of the 
variables in the mediation model.   
If the positivity bias is replicated in future research, more research should 
investigate its scope and potential mechanisms behind it (e.g., increased attention to 
positives versus decreased attention to negatives).  As mentioned earlier, fatigue may 
mask effects of mindfulness inductions in novices, so this could be investigated and 
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controlled for in future studies.   It also could be revealing to test if mindfulness increases 
learning through positive reinforcement.  Further, it could be helpful to measure 
positivity bias along with recovery or disengagement from negative stimuli, to see if the 
latter plays a role in the former.    
The potential for a lack of bias should continue to be investigated as well.  The 
current research suggests that mindfulness may reduce bias toward novel, ambiguous 
targets.  This should be replicated with multiple forms of stimuli.  Research could also 
investigate if and how mindfulness affects the ability to discriminate between familiar 
stimuli of a defined valence and similar but new stimuli of an undefined valence.   
Conclusion 
The present research was a preliminary step in testing for causal links between 
mindfulness and bias.  Mindfulness was found to reduce negativity bias, and this may 
partially explain why mindfulness reduces emotional distress.  Surprisingly, mindfulness 
also produced a positivity bias on measures of attitude formation and optimism – tasks 
with clearly valenced stimuli.  It also appeared that mindfulness reduced bias overall in 
generalizing attitudes to ambiguous stimuli.  The findings may have important 
implications for how mindfulness contributes to psychological well-being, as well as how 
individuals perceive and interpret their broader social worlds. 
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